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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,

CaseNo.20040746-SC

ROBERT BRIAN PEDOCKIE,
Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON CERTIORARI REVIEW
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari to review the court of
appeals' decision in State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App. 224, 95 P.3d 1182 (a copy of the court
of appeals' decision is attached in Addendum A). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (West 2004).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. A. Did defendant's persistent dilatory conduct over a prolonged period constitute
an implied waiver of his right to counsel where the trial judge provided ample warnings and
made every effort to accommodate defendant's invocation of his right to counsel?
B. Did defendant's conduct establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right
to counsel where he repeatedly invoked the right while consistently and repeatedly refusing

to cooperate with multiple appointed and retained counsel, appeared at hisfifthtrial setting
without retained counsel despite numerous warnings that such action would result in self
representation, and engaged in multiple efforts to frustrate any trial?
"On certiorari review 'we review the court of appeals' decision, not the opinion of the
[trial] court.' State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, \ 10,458 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. That decision is then
reviewed for correctness. Id." State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, ^ 7,65 P.3d 1180; State v.
7rane, 2002 UT 97416,57P.3d 1052. "Whether a waiver of counsel was made knowingly
and intelligently is a mixed question of law and fact. [This Court] reviewfs] the trial court's
legal determinations for correctness." State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,914 (Utah 1998). The
trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See State v. Vancleave, 2001 UT
App 228, If 5, 29 P.3d 680, cert, denied, 40 P.3d 1135 (Utah 2001).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to the issues on
appeal and is attached in Addendum B. Defendant preserved no state constitutional claim
for appeal. See State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App. 224,130, 95 P.3d 1182 n.5. Add. A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping, afirstdegree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999) (in Addendum C). Defendant adamantly refused to
represent himself and insisted over the course of twenty-one months that he wanted counsel.
Eventually, defendant had multiple appointed counsel, multiple retained counsel, standby
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counsel, four trial continuances, more than twenty-one months to prepare, and multiple
warnings from the trial judge in at least seven hearings that if he did not follow counsels'
advice he would go to trial representing himself. After ample warning that he would
represent himself if he appeared at his fifth trial setting without counsel, defendant appeared
without counsel, insisted that standby counsel be dismissed, and went to trial representing
himself, all the while repeatedly insisting that he wanted counsel and that he was not
relinquishing his right to counsel.1
At his initial appearance on February 20,2001, defendant was found indigent, and the
court appointed the Weber County Public Defenders Office ["PDA"] to represent him
(Rl3-14,259,279; R463:2). Defendant's first attorney, Mr. Bouwhuis, asked to be released
because of an unidentified conflict (R474:13; R476:3; R477:5).
On April 10, 2001, the assigned judge recused herself and transferred the case to a
new judge to schedule the preliminary hearing (R17-18; R463:6). In addition, defendant
filed a pro se request for disposition of charges pursuant to the speedy trial statute (R17,2325). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (West 2004).
Mr. Boyle was defendant's second PDA attorney and represented defendant at the
preliminary hearing (R13-14; R26-28; R463:3; R465: passim). The trial judge bound
defendant over as charged and set trial for August 13,2001 (R465:142-45). Defendant had

because review turns on defendant's conduct below throughout the lengthy pretrial proceedings, the State presents the procedural information in some detail and
includes additional detail in the Argument in subsection B, infra.
3

prepared a pro se discovery motion and a "motion of dismissal/' the latter alleging that "they
violated my due process and a few of my rights" (R465:145-46). The court attempted to set
it on the criminal law calendar, but defendant wanted more than thirty minutes to present the
motion and insisted on signing it with his counsel (R465:146-50).
Defendant did not file the motion to dismiss after the hearing (R31). Instead, eight
working days before the Monday trial, and over the prosecutor's objection, defendant sought
and received a continuance of the trial to December 10 (R40; R466:5-7,21,24). Mr. Boyle
needed time to address several motions and to conduct additional investigation (R463:8-9).
Prior to October 30, 2001, Mr. Boyle's contract with Weber County was terminated,
and Mr. Retallick assumed representation of defendant as his third PDA attorney (R53,
82-83; R467:3; R468:4). On October 25, defendant wrote to the judge complaining that Mr.
Boyle did not file any of defendant's motions and seeking to discuss allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct with the court (R53).
At a Ramirez hearing on November 29, the prosecutor sought the only continuance
of the trial date she would request in this case, citing a trial in another murder case predating
this one with an in-custody defendant (R467:128-29).

The trial court granted the

continuance, finding good cause existed for it, and set the trial a third time, moving it to
February 4,2002 (R467:132-34). Defendant took the opportunity to again complain that that
counsel had not filed his motiong (R467:125,128). The court advised defendant that his pro
se filings were causing problems and that he needed to file through his attorney (R467:149).
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Mr. Retallick continued to represent defendant until a conflict arose over defendant's
motions (R468: 2). At a pretrial hearing on January 9,2002, Mr. Retallick stated:
Your Honor, I believe there's a conflict of interest. Mr. Pedockie's
requested that I file motions in - - specific motions. He gave me a list of five.
I indicated to him that there was one that might have justification to be filed
but that I refused to file the others. He's indicated that because of that, because
of my refusal to file - -1 have an ethical obligation to my client but I also have
an ethical obligation to the Court not to file what I believe to be absolutely
frivolous motions, and so I refused to do that. And so he's wished - - he
requested that I be terminated from the case as his attorney. So at this point in
time I'm going to move that public defenders be released in representation of
Mr. Pedockie on this matter.
(R468:2). In a subsequently-filed affidavit explaining this conflict, Mr. Retallick wrote, "Mr.
Pedockie was difficult to work with. He repeatedly requested the filing of frivolous motions
and made outlandish, unfounded accusations about the prosecutor, judge and myself (R3 80).
At the January 9 hearing, defendant sought appointment of a new attorney to "submit
the motions that I would ask for because that is my right" (R468:2-3,5-8,11). The trial court
explained that defendant could not "pick and choose" among the public defenders (R468:3),
and that if defendant refused to accept the advice of his appointed attorney, he could either
"represent [himjself or get [his] own attorney" (R468:5, 9,11-12). The court explained that
it would not force Mr. Retallick to file motions that he believed were frivolous and invited
defendant to file them pro se (R468:5,6,ll). Defendant refused and insisted that he be
appointed as co-counsel so he could sign the motions with his attorney (R468:7,17).
Defendant ultimately chose to stay with Mr. Retallick but wanted it on record that he had not
filed "at least... seven motions" (R468:7-9). Out of concern for the record, he listed his
5

motions, which included a motion to dismiss for violation of his statutory speedy trial right,
and motions involving prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, the need
for a physical line-up, and a change of venue {see note 5, infra).
Nine days later—and ten working days before trial—the court received a letter from
defendant formally firing Mr. Retallick (Rl 17). The court allowed PDA to withdraw at the
January 23 hearing, and defendant claimed that he had retained Ed Brass as his fourth
attorney (Rl 18-19; R.469:2-4).
One week later—three working days before trial—Scott Williams appeared on behalf
of Mr. Brass, and, with defendant's express consent, continued the trial to April 15
(Rl 18,122-23,130; R463:12-14). Mr. Brass represented defendant for about two months
without incident, appearing at the April 10 pre-trial conference with no sign of any problem
(R130,147,165,167; R470: passim; R471:2). Then, in aphone conference on April 12—one
working day before trial—Mr. Brass told the court that his "interests may conflict with
[defendant's] in this case. And there's really no way that I can proceed to be his attorney"
(R184-85,190-91,330-31; R471:2-15). This conflict apparently arose because defendant
again wanted his counsel to file motions that counsel felt were frivolous (R471:9; R473:2,56,9-11,14; R477:5-6).
Defendant again rejected appointed counsel, Mr. Brass offered to help defendant
retain new counsel and report back to the court (Rl 84; R471:2-3, 15-17). The trial court
then cautioned defendant, "I want Mr. Pedockie to understand, I'm not gonna continue this
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case again, Mr. Pedockie. I don't care [what] your excuse or reason is, you either get an
attorney who will represent you on the matter or you're just gonna represent yourself next
time it's scheduled" (Rl 84; R471:15). Defendant said that he understood that he had to get
a lawyer to represent him or he would have to represent himself (R471:16).
Mr. Caine appeared at the next hearing as attorney number five for defendant and
stated that he believed defendant was trying to retain counsel, and that he "certainly has
significant resources to hire private counsel and that's what he wants to do. He doesn't want
the public defender to enter in this case" (R472:2). Defendant said he was trying to hire
Sheldon Carter, complained that he had "a problem about" the prosecutor, and once more
objected to the court's ruling on his 120-day disposition request months earlier (R472:3-6).
The court continued the case until May 29 at defendant's request to accommodate Mr.
Carter's schedule, warning defendant, "you need to have an attorney here though on that
date"(R222-23;R472:7).
Defendant appeared on May 29 without counsel (R229-230; R 473:2). He stated that
all the attorneys he had contacted believed it was unethical to file the motions that he had
(R473:2). Defendant repeatedly demanded an in camera hearing to discuss prosecutorial
misconduct and insisted that his motions were "crucial" and had to be filed (R473:2-7,l 112,14,24,32). At the same time, defendant balked whenever the trial judge stated that he
could file the motions himself (R473:6-7,l 1-12).
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The trial judge believed that defendant was trying to "hold the system captive" and
warned defendant at least six times at this hearing alone that the matter would be set for trial
and that defendant would need to get a lawyer or go forward representing himself (R473:4,
6-7,10,20-21,29).

He explained that attorneys kept withdrawing due to defendant's

insistence that they "do something that's unethical" and that the problem would continue
unless defendant started following counsel's advice (R473:15-18). Defendant wanted to talk
with PDA, but at the same time wanted nothing to do with them (R473:17-18). He ultimately
refused PDA's help, explaining that they could not represent him because they were not
entirely supportive of his position (R473: 19). When PDA was offered as stand-by counsel,
defendant agreed with the understanding that he would continue looking to retain counsel (R
473:20). He also repeatedly insisted the motions be filed before trial (R473:17-18,23-24).
Ultimately, the judge opined (R473: 20-21):
Well, what I want you to understand, Mr. Pedockie, is I'm going to
schedule this for trial. I don't care if you show up by yourself, with a public
defender, or a private attorney. We're going to trial on this case. You're not
going to hold the system hostage any longer. Okay? That's what this all
amounts to. I'm not going to sit around waiting for you to decide who you
want to represent you. We're going to schedule this for trial. . . . If you
contact an attorney and he wants to represent you, fine. But he's not going to
come in here and tell me, Judge, I can't make that trial date. We're going to
trial on this case, one way or the other.... You can file all the motions you
want, but I'm going to give you a trial date . . . and we're going to move
backwards from that date.
The judge set the trial date for the fifth and final time to start on September 30,2002,
giving defendant a full month to file his motions (R473:25-26,33). When defendant asked
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what would happen if he could not get someone to file his motions timely, the judge
explained that standby counsel would help, but defendant was "lead counsel" (R473:27-28).
Defendant insisted he could not represent himself, and the court reiterated that he could hire
anyone he wished but that the deadlines would not be changed (R473:28-29). Defendant
continued to complain, the judge repeated his explanations, and a PDA attorney explained
to defendant how to present his issues to his standby counsel (R 473:28-31). Defendant filed
three motions, pro se, on July 5 (R241-54).
On June 13,2002, Paul Grant entered an appearance as defendant's sixth counsel (R.
232-235). However, on July 5, 2002, before appearing in court, Mr. Grant moved to
withdraw, claiming that defendant no longer wanted him to be counsel of record (R23 8-239).
The trial court approved the withdrawal (R240).
When defendant appeared at the July 31 motion hearing, he initially stated that he
wanted to wait for his attorney, Mr. Grant, despite having received a copy of Mr. Grant's
withdrawal motion noting that he had beenfired(R474:2). Defendant claimed that he did not
fire Mr. Grant and that he did not know if Mr. Grant was still representing him (R474:2-3,67). Defendant stated that if he had known his attorney would not appear on his behalf, he
would have gotten another one, insisting that an attorney was necessary to handle his other
motions, "paperwork" and evidence, and that an in camera hearing before a different judge
was necessary (R474:3-5,7-8,11,14,24). Predictably, defendant demanded new counsel but
refused PDA (R300-01; R474:8-9,ll-13). The judge again explained the pattern of
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defendant's conduct and the reason defendant could not keep counsel and gave defendant the
choice of appointed or retained counsel or self-representation (R474:8-13). Defendant
accepted a public defender, and Martin Gravis became defendant's seventh counsel (R475:3).
The trial judge explained to him that he was standby counsel until such time as defendant
decided that he would follow counsel's advice (R300-01; R474:13; R475:3).
At the subsequent motion hearing, defendant complained that standby counsel would
not argue his motions, refused to argue them himself, and repeatedly invoked his right to
counsel for the hearing (R476:2-5,7,8,10-11,13,18). The judge again explained the need for
defendant to listen to counsel's advice, that defendant could retain anyone he wanted, that
new counsel could file or re-file any motions, but that trial would not be continued (R476:38,18-19,21). Defendant attempted to avoid arguing his motions, offering to hire an attorney
by the hour to do it, seeking to take his claim for an attorney to a different court, and agreeing
to listen to any attorney if that attorney would argue his motions (R476:9-10). Defendant only
argued his motions upon being assured that the record reflected his invocation of his right
to counsel (R476:10-13). Before denying each motion, the judge explained why the issues
were premature or irrelevant (R304-05,321-34; R476:20-21,23-28,30,40). He also recited
the procedural history of the case in detail (R304-05,321-34; R476:21,27,30-45) (see
Addendum D).
At all subsequent hearings prior to trial, defendant repeated ad nauseum his request
for counsel (R477:3-4,6,8-10,16; R478:3-5; R479:3-8; 459:7,13,19-20). The trial court
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explained repeatedly why he refused to appoint counsel, reiterated that defendant could hire
whomever he pleased, and explained that until he did, he would be proceeding pro se with
Mr. Gravis as second chair and having only limited involvement (R477:4-7,9; R479:4-7).
Defendant complained that Mr. Gravis would not file defendant's motions, and Mr. Gravis
clarified that he would only file motions he felt were appropriate (R477:6-7).
Nearly seven weeks before trial, the judge and standby counsel explained the
subpoena process, told defendant what he needed to do, and recommended that he start soon
(R476:16-18). Defendant waited until two working days before trial to begin the process
(R459:l 5-16). Nearly four weeks before trial, the judge explained to defendant the need for
written voir dire and proposed jury instructions (R478:2-5). Defendant submitted pro se
written objections to the State's jury instructions (R355), but expressly refused to submit the
written instructions prepared by Mr. Gravis, submitted no voir dire questions, and claimed
surprise at trial when he was told he would not be able to verbally ask questions of the jury
panel (R479:2-3, 11; R459:10-ll, 15-16).
At the pretrial conference immediately prior to seating a jury on September 30,
defendant appeared without counsel, continued to invoke his right to counsel, and insisted
he did notwanttorepresenthimself (R459:3-4,7,13,17-18,19-20) (in Addendum E). Once
more, the judge explained the procedural history of the case, noting the specific conduct of
defendant that repeatedly caused the absence of counsel (R459:5-8). When defendant
complained of Mr. Gravis's alleged failure to represent him and blamed him for the absence
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of defense witnesses, the trial judge again explained the role of standby counsel as well as
the legal issues with which Mr. Gravis could be helpful (R459:4-5,13-20). After further
discussion about prior defense counsel and their withdrawals, the judge insisted that trial
proceed, and defendant sought removal of Mr. Gravis (R459:3-14). The trial judge's
explanation of some of the disadvantages of self-representation was repeatedly interrupted
by defendant's multiple complaints about the system, standby counsel, and his own
inadequacies, after which the judge excused Mr. Gravis (R459:15-20).2 Defendant then
explained,"... I'd like to have it on record that I didn't voluntarily [fire Mr. Gravis], but I'd
like to have counsel here, but somebody that has my best interests . . . at stake instead of
somebody that's not gonna argue anything or say anything in my behalf (R459:20).
Defendant represented himself at trial and was convicted defendant as charged. The
trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term often years to life in prison, to be
served consecutively with the sentence he was already serving at the time (R449-50).
Defendant timely appealed through appointed counsel (R453).

2

The court explained:

. . . . He is trained in the law. He can help you on the law, the legal
issues here, about the voir dire, about the jury selection, about the jury
instructions, about cross-examination, there's a number of issues that he
could help you with on this case. He doesn't represent you, but he certainly
can give you advice.
(R459:17-18). Defendant interrupted, and the court did not return to his explanation.
However, this was only one of several points at which the court discussed the benefits of
standby counsel and the dangers of self-representation. See Argument, subsectionB, infra.
12

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Nicole Sather met defendant while he was in prison and dated him briefly when he
was paroled (R459:137-38). Shortly after they broke up, defendant appeared on her doorstep
in the early morning hours of January 3,2001, and threatened to kill her if she did not go for
a ride with him and his younger cousin, Justin (R459:38,142-48,152-54). The three drove
from Ogden to Payson, and defendant told Nicole on the way that she had messed with him
one too many times and they would kill her in Payson (R459:155-64). During the trip,
defendant and Justin had quite a bit to drink, and Justin kept by his side an S.K.S. rifle that
later proved to be loaded (R459:159).
When they arrived in Payson, Nicole found an opportunity to try to drive away (R
459:170-73). But Justin shot at, and hit, the truck while defendant managed to get into the
pickup and jump on Nicole to keep her from getting away (R459:170-71). Defendant
became angry at the hole in his truck, and Nicole offered to pay for the damage (R459:17374). They called her credit union to verify that she had enough to cover it (R459:175-77).
Defendant was appeased, and they returned to Salt Lake City to drop off Justin and the gun
(R459:180-81). Defendant took Nicole home and stayed with her all night (R459:182-86).
Nicole knew defendant and some of his friends, knew that he could be violent, and
knew that he had been in prison (R459:137-41,186-87). She did not want to make him mad,
so she decided to give him what he wanted and get away from him (R459:140-41,186).

13

However, the next morning, defendant drove them toward Park City, telling her that he was
going to fulfill a dream he had and kill himself after killing her (R459:200-01).
They stopped for gas near Park City (R459:201-03). Nicole went with defendant into
the store and slipped away from him (id). She ran upstairs where one clerk hid her in a
trucker's shower (R459:204-05; R460:81-84,86).

The clerk went downstairs where

defendant was frantically looking for a blonde woman, but the clerk denied having seen one
(R460:86-88). Defendant eventually left (R460:90).
The clerk retrieved Nicole, and they called 911 (R460:91-94). Nicole was eventually
persuaded to tell the Ogden police what happened (R450:183-84; R459:211). During an
investigation, the police talked to defendant and Justin, who claimed to have the same alibi
(R450:185,196-97). After officers found the bullet and the bullet hole in the truck, Justin
gave police the gun and said that they intended to kill Nicole that night (R460:190-91,20305,215-18). He described defendant's obsession with Nicole and his plan to end it by killing
her, where they were going to put the body, what their alibi would be for the night, and what
he had done with the gun once he knew the police were investigating (R461:75-79,82-85).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Subsection A: The trial judge properly determined that defendant had waived his
right to counsel by his persistent dilatory conduct, which contradicted his repeated verbal
invocation of the right. The court of appeals found that the waiver was voluntary and
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unambiguous, noted the absence of any Frampton colloquy, then held that the waiver was
not knowing and intelligent.
Where manipulative and disruptive conduct by defendant obstructs the orderly and
efficient progress of the case and gives rise to an implied waiver of the right to counsel, a
thorough de novo review of that conduct is required to determine the validity of the implied
waiver. Consideration should be given not only to what the conduct reveals about
defendant's knowledge and understanding regarding the consequences of his continued
conduct and the difficulties inherent in self-representation, but also to the effect of
defendant's manipulation on the court's ability to move the matter forward. Implied waiver
by conduct requires that the trial court conduct a balancing of these factors, making a
thorough de novo review of the record on appeal more imperative.
Alternatively, extraordinary circumstances exist in this case because the dilatory
conduct occurred over a prolonged period of time, defendant's own unreasonable demands
prevented him from retaining counsel, he refused to proceed pro se even though his conduct
made it unavoidable, and his conduct thwarted the trial judge's multiple attempts to move the
matter forward by use of every other reasonable alternative, leaving the judge to proceed as
he did if this matter was ever to advance to trial. Absent de novo review under these
circumstances, the system is open to manipulation by intelligent defendants and can be
dangerously undermined unless de novo review is permitted.
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Subsection B: De novo review of the record reveals that defendant's waiver of his
right to counsel was both knowing and intelligent. Even absent a Frampton colloquy, the
record shows that defendant understood the ramifications of appearing at trial without
counsel and the sorts of dangers inherent in representing himself against a serious charge.
Defendant also understood both the nature of the first degree felony charge of aggravated
kidnapping and the range of possible punishments which he could suffer from a conviction.
In any event, where the waiver of the right to counsel arises from conduct intended
by defendant to delay or prevent trial, that conduct may be seen as the functional equivalent
of a knowing and intelligent waiver. By his conduct, defendant delayed the efficient running
of the judicial process nearly twenty-one months. He repeatedly and unreasonably rejected
competent appointed and retained counsel while insisting on his right to representation by
counsel, he adopted and refused to abandon a position that would require his counsel to act
unethically and thereby prevented accommodation of his right to counsel, he refused to
cooperate with three appointed counsel and vacillated between accepting and rejecting help
from PDA, he unreasonably insisted that his counsel file and argue his pre-trial motions even
after they were rejected by the trial court, he delayed the proceedings at every turn and
manipulated the facts to shift blame for the delays away from himself, he ultimately rejected
even standby counsel, and he ignored numerous attempts by the trial judge to move the case
forward. This conduct, together with defendant's ultimate appearance at trial without
retained counsel despite his ability to hire one and numerous warnings that failure to have
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counsel would result in self-representation, establish the functional equivalent of a knowing
and intelligent waiver.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S PERSISTENT DILATORY CONDUCT OVER A
PROLONGED PERIOD, DESPITE THE TRIAL COURT'S
WARNINGS AND EFFORTS TO ACCOMMODATE HIS REQUEST
FOR COUNSEL, IMPLIEDLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL,
AND DE NOVO REVIEW OF THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT
THE WAIVER WAS KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT
INTRODUCTION
A defendant may waive his right to counsel so long as he does so knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. See, generally, State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah
1987). The court of appeals panel properly determined that defendant had been given
constitutionally permissible choices by which to achieve his right to counsel, and that "his
choice, however reluctant or conditional, was voluntary and unambiguous." State v.
Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224, \ 34,95 P.3d 1182 (quoting State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, \21,
979 P.2d 799, reh'g denied (Jun 16, 1999)) (emphasis in Pedockie).
The preferred method of establishing whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent is
by use of an on-the-record colloquy between the trial court and the defendant in which the
defendant is fully informed "of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that
the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
open." Bakalov, 1999 UT45 at^[23 (quotingFrampton, 737 P.2d at 187 (additional citation
omitted)). Where such a colloquy is absent, this Court has determined there must be
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extraordinary circumstances before an appellate court "will look at any evidence in the record
to determine whether the particular facts and circumstances support a valid waiver." State
v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998).
However, more recently, this Court "was careful to note" that "the validity of a waiver
would turn not on whether the trial judge actually conducted the colloquy, but rather 'upon
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case.'" State v. Hassan, 2004 UT 99,
If 22, 514 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (quoting Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188), reh'g denied (Dec. 14,
2004). More specifically, this Court reiterated that it would "'look at any evidence in the
record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se."' Id.
(quoting Frampton, 131 P.2d at 188). While Hassan involved a case where detailed review
of the record was not called for because the trial court conducted two Frampton colloquys,
this Court's recognition of the need for and importance of record evidence absent a colloquy
without reference to the "exceptional circumstances" language of Heaton reaffirms the
importance of de novo review and properly places the focus on defendant's knowledge and
understanding instead of on the information imparted by the court.
Because the trial court in this case conducted no Frampton colloquy, the court of
appeals turned to the existence of extraordinary circumstances before deciding the waiver's
validity. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224 at ^ 35. The panel sidestepped the question, however,
noting that even if such circumstances existed, a de novo review of the record revealed that
the waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent. Id. atfflf35-39. Specifically, the court held
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that the record lacked any indication that defendant understood the nature of the charge
against him, the range of possible punishments, or the consequences of self-representation.
Id. atffif36-38.
The court of appeals' opinion does not reflect a thorough de novo review of the record
because the panel failed to expressly evaluate the relationship between defendant's conduct
and his knowledge of the charge, the possible punishments, and the risks of selfrepresentation. The waiver of the right to counsel in this case was implied from defendant's
dilatory and obstructionist behavior and occurred despite his repeated verbal invocation of
the right. A thorough review of that behavior in light of the surrounding circumstances is,
therefore, critical. See United States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317,1323-24 (10th Cir. 1999), cert
denied, 529 U.S. 1022 (2000). A proper and thorough review must take into account the
totality of the conduct which gave rise to the implied waiver and the effect of that conduct
on the trial court's finding that the waiver was both knowing and intelligent. An appropriate
review of the record here reveals that the waiver was both knowing and intelligent,
A.

WHERE WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS BASED ON
DEFENDANT'S DILATORY CONDUCT AND NO COLLOQUY WAS
CONDUCTED, DE NOVO REVIEW OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL
IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE WAIVER
There is no doubt either that a defendant has a state and federal constitutional right

to counsel in criminal proceedings, or that he may waive that right and exercise his right to
conduct his own defense. See Hassan, 2004 UT 99 at f 21 (reviewing an affirmative waiver
of the right to counsel); Frampton, 131 P.2d at 187 (same). Waiver frequently occurs
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through an affirmative request either to waive the right to counsel or to invoke the right to
proceed pro se. See Hassan, 2004 UT 99 at ffif 20, 24; Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at Tf 19.
"[W]aiver in the right to counsel context" is generally used to refer to an "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." LaFave, Israel & King, Criminal
Procedure, §11.3(c) at 547-48 (2d ed. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also United States v.
Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099 (5th Cir. 1995). Consequently, trial courts must ensure that
waivers are knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Hassan, 2004 UT 99, at f 21; State v.
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, at ^ 15.
It is also widely recognized that circumstances exist in which a defendant may
impliedly waive or forfeit his right to counsel by his conduct in lieu of his words. See
generally LaFave, Israel & King, supra, §11.3 at 548; see also Hughes, 191 F.3d at 1323-24
("a defendant may waive his right to counsel by his conduct, particularly when the conduct
consists of tactics designed to delay the proceedings"). At the extreme are cases involving
physically combative defendants whose egregious behavior permits a "forfeiture" of the right
to counsel, regardless of the existence of a colloquy. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F. 3d
237, 249 (3rd Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by physically
assaulting his attorney), cert denied, 528 U.S. 868 (1999); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d
322, 325-26 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that "a defendant who is abusive toward his attorney
may forfeit his right to counsel"); State v. Montgomery, 530 S.E.2d 66, 69 (N.C. 2000)
(defendant forfeited his right to counsel without a colloquy where he purposefully sought to
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delay the proceedings by refusing to cooperate with his counsel and assaulting him).
"Forfeiture" entails "the loss of a right regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and
irrespective of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right." United States v.
Goldberg, 61 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3rd Cir. 1995); see generally LaFave, Israel & King, supra,
§ 11.3(c) at 547-48.
A defendant's conduct which falls short of physical assault but is no less disruptive
and repugnant may give rise to an implied "waiver by conduct." See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at
1099-1100 ("Once a defendant has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he engages
in dilatory tactics, any misconduct thereafter may be treated as an implied request to proceed
pro se and, thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel."); see generally LaFave, Israel & King,
supra, § 11.3(c) at 547-48. Many courts do not distinguish between "waiver by conduct" and
"forfeiture," but they agree that circumstances exist in which a defendant's actions may speak
louder than his words, and his conduct may justify implication of a waiver despite the
absence of any affirmative verbal request. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (a
defendant may lose his Sixth Amendment right to be present at trial whether or not he wishes
it where he is aware of the consequences of his continued conduct and fails to change that
conduct); see Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099, 1100 (noting the confusion between the terms in
many courts).
One area in which courts agree that a waiver by conduct may arise is when dealing
with a defendant's manipulative and disruptive behavior. See Hughes, 191 F.3d at 1323-24
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("[Wjhere a defendant egregiously manipulates the constitutional right to counsel so as to
delay, disrupt, or prevent the orderly administration ofjustice[,]" he "may waive his right to
counsel by his conduct"); United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1390 (10th Cir. 1991)
("[Tjhere must be some limit to the defendant's ability to manipulate the judicial system")
(quoting United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d at 111), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1106 (1992); Tyler
v. State, 581 S.W.2d 328, 330-31 (Ark. 1979) (where the right to retain counsel is
manipulated to obstruct the orderly procedures of the court, a waiver of the right to counsel
exists); King v. Superior Court, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 585, 596 (Cal. App 3rd Dist 2003) ("Courts
cannot tolerate misconduct by a defendant that seeks to delay or disrupt judicial
proceedings."); State v. Tarumoto, 614 P.2d 397, 399-400 (Ha. 1980) (failure to attempt to
obtain counsel evidenced a deliberate and intentional rejection of counsel and unequivocally
waived the right to counsel); Cummings v. Newton, 546 N.W.2d 406, 420 (Wis. 1996)
(continual refusal to cooperate with court-appointed counsel while at the same time refusing
to waive the right to counsel "cannot be condoned when [it is] used solely to 'interfere with
the proper administration of criminal justice.'") (quoting A lien, 397 U.S. at 343); see also
LaFavre, Israel & King, supra, § 1 ] .3(e) at 548 ("What these courts have held, in effect, is
that the state's interest in maintaining an orderly trial schedule and the defendant's
negligence, indifference, or possibly purposeful delaying tactic, combined to justify a
forfeiture of defendant's right to counsel in much the same way that defendant's disruptive
behavior or voluntary absence can result in the forfeiture of his right to be present at trial").
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All such manipulative conduct, however subtle or covert, possesses the potential to delay or
disrupt judicial proceedings.
The triggering event for judicial review of a defendant's conduct is when, as here, the
court suspects that the "'orderly and efficient progression of the case [is] being frustrated"'
by defendant. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d 406,418 n.15 (Wis. 1996) (quoting State v. Woods,
424 N.W.2d 730 (Wis. App 1988)). When the review reveals that the conduct is designed
to manipulate the judicial system, an implied waiver is appropriate. See Brickert v. State, 673
N.E.2d 493,496 (Ind. App 1997) (where defendant's conduct can amount only to a deliberate
attempt to frustrate the judicial process and avoid being brought to trial, his conduct amounts
to an unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel), reh yg denied (Feb. 20, 1997); Colbert v.
State, 714 P.2d 209, 211 (Ok. Cr. App. 1986) (a one year delay in getting the case to trial
because of defendant's failure to retain counsel was "inexcusable and done solely for dilatory
purposes" and amounted to a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel);
Cummings, 546 N.W.2d at 418-19 (defendant's obvious dissatisfaction with his three
appointed counsel, his refusal to accept their advice, and his unwillingness to waive his right
to counsel demonstrated his agenda of delay designed to prevent trial).
Even courts favoring an express colloquy when reviewing an express waiver of the
right to counsel will embark on a de novo review of manipulative conduct in the absence of
a colloquy to determine whether it gives rise to an implied waiver of the right to counsel.
See, e.g., Willie, 941 F.2d at 1390-91 (defendant's conduct constitutes an implied waiver of
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his right to counsel, even absent a formal inquiry, where the circumstances establish that he
was playing "a cat and mouse game with the court"); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d
163, 166-67 (10th Cir. 1980) (even absent a formal colloquy, the record showed both
defendant's impermissible "game" with the court and his understanding of the dangers of
self-representation, so that his "stubborn failure to hire an attorney constituted a knowing and
intelligent waiver" of the right to counsel); see also United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319,
1321-22 and n. 1 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that in waiver by conduct cases, "a majority of the
circuits have adopted a nonformalistic approach to determining sufficiency of the waiver
from the record as a whole rather than requiring a deliberate and searching inquiry."). This
is, in part, due to the fact that, left unchecked, a defendant bent on delay will be able to hold
the system hostage, thereby delaying or preventing the "efficient and effective administration
of criminal justice," until the likelihood of a fair trial, or any trial at all, is extremely remote.
See Cummings, 546 N.W.2d at 419-20 (permitting review of defendant's manipulative
conduct absent a colloquy and recognizing that a court's inability to determine that defendant
has forfeited his right to counsel by his conduct would theoretically permit an intelligent
defendant to "go through tens of court-appointed attorneys and delay his trial for years").
A trial court must balance the real potential for significant harm to the proceedings
which arises from a defendant's manipulative conduct against defendant's preservation of
his constitutional rights and must provide sufficient opportunity for the exercise of those
rights without permitting defendant's disruptive and dilatory conduct to undermine the
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system or the prosecution before the court. See United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952,956
(10th Cir. 1987); see also Siniard v. State, 491 So.2d 1062, 1064 (Al. Cr. App 1986)
(defendant may not indefinitely postpone trial by his dilatory conduct but may be required
to proceed to trial without counsel); People v. Williams, 440 N.E.2d 843, 846 (111. 1982) (a
defendant may not use his right to counsel "as a weapon to indefinitely thwart the
administration of justice or to otherwise embarrass the effective prosecution of crime")
(quoting People v. Friedman, 403 N.E.2d 229 (111. 1980)) (additional quotation omitted).
That balancing is most appropriately demonstrated in the record evidence, especially
where the defendant is bent on delay and the trial court believes that the colloquy would be
superfluous, as occurred here (R473:12-14). See, e.g., State v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538,540 (5th
Cir. 1983) ("a persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment of
new counsel... is the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel");
Brickert, 673 N.E.2d at 496 (where defendant's conduct "can only be interpreted as a
deliberate attempt to frustrate the judicial process," advisements of the dangers of selfrepresentation and warnings of the consequences of defendant's continued conduct would
have been superfluous); Cummings, 546 N. W.2d at 418-19 (when faced with a manipulative
or disruptive defendant, a court may find that the manipulative conduct gives rise to an
implied waiver of the right to counsel by operation of law). To facilitate that balancing, some
courts look to whether defendant was adequately informed of how his conduct was offensive
and of the effect the continued conduct would have on his invocation of his right to counsel.
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Once warned, continuation of the conduct evidences a valid waiver. See Allen, 397 U.S. at
343 (permitting an implied waiver by conduct of defendant's right to be present at trial "after
he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive
behavior" where he thereafter continued the same conduct); Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d
753 (5th Cir. 1984) (waiver was impliedfromdefendant's conduct where he was repeatedly
informed that new counsel would not be appointed for him, he knew the result of his
continued conduct would be self-representation, and he continued the same conduct); United
States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir.) (defendant's refusal to retain counsel, despite
his ability to do so and his verbal invocation of his right to counsel, amounted to a waiver of
the right to counsel where the judge told him enough about self-representation "to steer any
reasonable person away from [it]"), cert denied, 506 U.S. 882 (1992).
Consequently, not only may a defendant waive his right to counsel by his manipulative
and disruptive conduct, but the appellate court's evaluation of that implied waiver should
include not only a review of the verbal exchanges between defendant and the trial court, but
a review of defendant's conduct under the specific circumstances. Otherwise, the system is
open to manipulation by canny defendants in a manner that is not at issue when a defendant
verbally and unambiguously waives his right to counsel or affirmatively invokes his right to
self-representation.
The trial judge in this case expressly recognized defendant's manipulation and abuse
of the system and clearly felt that the "orderly and efficient progression of the case [was]

26

being frustrated" (R331; R473:l 1,18,20-21; R.479:5-8; R.459:7,9,l 1). See Cumrnings, 546
N.W.2d at 418 n. 15. Consequently, a careful de novo review of the record is necessary to
determine the validity of the implied waiver by conduct. Assuming that a Frampton colloquy
is relevant in waiver-by-conduct cases, defendant's offending conduct, blatantly
contradictory to his repetitious invocation of his right to counsel, is inseparablefromthe trial
court's determination that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and
requires review in the absence of a colloquy (R459:7).
Given the facts at hand, the absence of authority in this jurisdiction to guide the trial
court's actions, and the potential for systemic damagefromthe precedent set by the court of
appeals' decision, a detailed de novo review of the record is warranted to properly evaluate
whether defendant had the intelligence and capacity to understand the ramifications of his
persistent invocation of the right to counsel and his contradictory sabotage of that right
through his conduct. Failure to do so may well encourage future dilatory conduct in attempts
to prolong the proceedings enough to prevent a fair trial on the merits of any charges.

B.

A DE NOVO REVIEW OF THE RECORD REVEALS THAT THE IMPLIED
WAIVER BY CONDUCT WAS KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT
The trial court's determination in this case that defendant's conduct gave rise to a

knowing and intelligent waiver is readily apparent from a proper de novo review of the
record, despite the absence of a colloquy. The waiver in this case arose from defendant's
dilatory and obstructionist conduct, which contradicted his repeated verbal invocation of his
right to counsel. The court of appeals found that the record lacked evidence that defendant
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"in fact understood the consequences of representing himself," and that he understood "the
nature of the charge against him and the range ofpossible punishments." Pedockie, 2004 UT
App 224, fflf 37-38. However, a thorough review of the record reveals defendant's
understanding of both points.
Alternatively, the totality of defendant's dilatory conduct under the circumstances of
this case amounts to the functional equivalent of a knowing and intelligent waiver.
1. The record demonstrates a knowing and intelligent waiver by conduct
Generally, a waiver of the right to counsel must be both knowing and intelligent, a
determination of which "turns upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each
case." See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at *| 22 (additional quotation omitted). Under the facts of
this case, defendant's implied waiver was both knowing and intelligent.
Difficulties inherent in self-representation-The record reveals defendant's
understanding of the difficulties inherent in self-representation. His adamant and repetitive
rejection of the option because of his lack of legal qualifications, and his insistence that an
attorney present defendant's own "crucial" motions even after defendant argued and lost
them pro se, speaks volumes about defendant's understanding of the importance of legal
training and the significance of his lay status (R103, 317; R467:31,139; R468:3,5,8,ll;
R471.-11; R473:6-7,12,25,28; R474:4,8-9,ll; R476:2-3,8-l 1,15,24-25; R477:3-4,6-7,8-9;
R478:4-5; R479:4). He clearly grasped that lawyers were schooled to conduct themselves
in court, that their ability to properly present a given issue increased the odds of success, and
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that he could not perform at the same level in a courtroom as an attorney (id). He also
understood that, as a non-lawyer, he was much less likely to persuade the court, let alone a
jury, of his position on any of the issues (id).
His conduct also revealed that he recognized the existence of rules and procedural
requirements as well as the fact that he was required to act within those requirements
whenever he represented himself (R248,251; R473:12; R459:3-4). For example, defendant
repeatedly demonstrated that he knew he must register objections and make a clear record,
that both would be required for an appeal, and that his lay status did not excuse him from
complying with those requirements (R.104,305,357;R465:146;R468:6-7,9,23-24;R471:3,56;R473:11-12;R474:2;R476:4,10-11,13-14,19,49^
R459:7-8). This was most obvious at the August 13,2002, motion hearing where defendant
spent most of the first fourteen pages of the transcript attempting to get a continuance to find
counsel to do his motions (R476:1 -14). When pushed to deal with the first motion, he noted,
"if I don't object then this is going to affect my appeal or whatever happens from the
outcome of my trial. This is a very important thing. I'd like an attorney to argue these so that
it's properly done." (R476:10). Standby counsel noted that defendant was concerned "about
preserving a record for appeal," and defendant demonstrated as much by repeatedly noting
that he wanted to be sure his objections and concerns were "on the record" (R476:10-11,13).
He recognized the need to support his claims with evidence when he cited to specific pages
of the preliminary hearing transcript during his argument, and, thereafter attached affidavits
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to his motion to dismiss for alleged prosecutorial misconduct and sought transcripts for use
in his defense (R241-47,353-54,357; R467:31,34; R474:3-4,10-l 1,13-14; R476:6,9-10,2223,34; R478:6-7; R479:3,6-7,9-10; R459:4-5).
Nothing in defendant's conduct suggested that he harbored any misgiving that pro se
representation would permit him to simply tell his story to the jury. Defendant knew that he
needed to be "familiar with the rules of evidence and procedures," that he was able to make
peremptory challenges, and that there was a proper way to cross-examine witnesses
(R248,251; R459:3-5,18). He knew he would be able to call witnesses but that he would
have to subpoena them himself (R305;R476:16-18,24-29,47-48;R459:3-5). Herecognized
that the procedural rules went beyond trial to impose time limits on filing an appeal and knew
those limits would apply to him (R476:10-l 1).
Defendant knew of the existence of the Utah Code, the state and federal constitutions,
and the rules of criminal procedure, and his proper use of these authorities in his written
documents and his many discussions with the court demonstrate his knowledge of their
usefulness and their application to his presentation of the legal issues in this case (R24854,318-20,355,357; R467:30-31; R459:3-4).

He also properly commented on the

impeachment evidence sought by the State, noting that it would be admissible only if it
related to his honesty or dishonesty, that he did not plan on taking the stand at trial, and that
he had a right to keep his past out by refusing to testify (R477:14-15; R478:6). He filed at
least 12 different pro se motions and other documents in the course of this case, and had
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already prepared the first motion and a discovery request before the preliminary hearing
(R26-27,145-46,149-50; R465:145-49).3 He prepared coherent objections to the State's
notice of intent to rely on hearsay (R356), and to the State's jury instructions (R355). He was
familiar with the code's statutory speedy trial provision and the statute under which he was
charged (R24,83,167,184,220,248-53,355,467;R466:5-6,138;R467:138-40). He knew he
was entitled to discovery and that he had to request it (R353-54; R459:4-5). He knew the
difference between "just a dismissal" and "a mistrial" and knew that a dismissal could be
"with prejudice" (R248-52; R476:24-25).
Defendant also knew that standby counsel was important in preparing for and
presenting trial and that he could be of help in dealing with the unknown rules and
restrictions that would confront defendant at trial The trial judge repeatedly informed
defendant that standby counsel could help him with much of the legal information, including
jury instructions, voir dire, subpoenas, evidentiary stipulations and issues generally, appeals,
and acquiring transcripts (R357; R474:ll-12; R475:l 1-12,16-19, 29-30; R476:27,47-50).

3

His pro se filings included: a motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct
(R241-47); a motion to dismiss for denial of fast and speedy trial (R248-51); a motion for
change of venue (R252-54); a motion to appeal the court's decision on his dismissal
motions (R317); a motion to dismiss for ineffective assistance of counsel (R318-20); a
notice of filing of petition for interlocutory appeal (R350-51); a request for voucher for
investigatory purposes (R352); a motion for production of evidence (R3 53-54); a
challenge to the state's proposed jury instructions (R355); an objection to the state's
notice of intent to rely on hearsay (R356); a motion to quash and to dismiss evidence of
his use of a gun (R386); and a motion to quash and suppress Nicole Sather's testimony
(R387-88).
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The judge expressly informed defendant that standby counsel was "trained in the law/' and
was available to give him advice on the law, including legal issues and procedural issues like
jury selection, cross-examination, drafting motions, and "a number of [other] issues"
(R459:4-5,14,16-17; R473:20,27-28; R477:4). Defendant actively used his standby counsel
during the August 13, 2002 motion hearing, asking him questions and expressing a need to
talk with him on certain matters outside the courtroom (R476: passim; R459:16-17). Clearly,
defendant knew that standby counsel had relevant information to impart regarding courtroom
presentations and legal details which were necessary to his pro se in-court performance, and
he knew that he himself did not possess that information.
The trial judge took a last opportunity before trial to explain to defendant some of the
details he could expect to face at trial. The court explained how to handle exhibits during
the trial, informed him that he could not wander around the courtroom but must remain at the
table, and explained that he must submit his voir dire questions in writing (R459:9-10).
Defendant repeatedly complained that he had "no clue" about what he was doing,
demonstrating that he understood the judge's expectation that he would have to comply with
the specific rules and boundaries inherent in conducting a trial (R459:3-4,l 1,13,17-18).
However, he also demonstrated that he expected to be no more restrained in his selfrepresentation than the prosecutor, clarifying that his access to the jury panel would be
identical (R459:10-11).

32

The fact that defendant insisted on the last-minute dismissal of his standby counsel
when it became clear that the trial was going to go forward does not demonstrate that
defendant did not understand the difficulties inherent in what he was about to do. It simply
shows his continued orchestration of the proceedings. He chose to put himself in a position
that would permit him to present the most favorable appellate argument possible because,
just as with his pre-trial motions, he knew he stood a minimal chance of success at trial
absent an attorney, and he knew he was no longer able to avoid trial.
Overall, the record demonstrates that defendant knew a good deal about what was
involved in a criminal case and what was expected of him whenever he was required to speak
for himself or argue his own case. He also repeatedly recognized his own limitations, noting
to the court his inability to represent himself against an educated attorney and the fact that
he knew "nothing about the law" (R317; R467:31,139; R468:l 1; R.473:6-7,25; R474:4,8;
R476:2-3,8-ll,15,24-25;R477:3-4,6,8-9;R478:4-5;R479:4). Itisapparentfromathorough
de novo review of defendant's conduct that he understood the difficulties inherent in selfrepresentation, even absent a recorded colloquy.
Nature of charge and possible punishment—Defendant also knew of the nature of
the charge and the potential punishment. Defendant admitted that, at the initial appearance,
the trial court reviewed the charge and the penalties with him (R6-7,252; R463:2). At
various points thereafter and throughout the lengthy pre-trial period, reference was made by
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the court and various counsel to the importance of the charges and the complicated nature
of the case (R252,352; R466:6-7,10-13).
Defendant repeatedly noted that the case was extremely important, the charge was
"serious[,]" and the severity of the charge required not only the assistance of counsel, but
nearly $4,000 in investigative funds for "scientific testing, witness gathering, testimony
taking, expert witnesses, paper, pencils, postage, etc." (R352; R464:13; R468:5-8). He cited
to the aggravated kidnapping statute in his pro se written objection to the State's proposed
jury instructions and challenged the elements outlined in the instructions, evincing an
understanding of the charge and its elements (R352,355).
When the judge bound the case over, he stressed that it was an aggravated kidnapping
and a first degree felony (R465:142). At various points throughout the proceedings, the
judge noted that the case involved aggravated kidnapping and was a first degree felony, and
that the charge was not only seriousness but that an attorney would require more than ten
days to prepare to defend it (R327; R473:8; R476:41-43). He told defendant, "The question
is whether or not you committed a first degree felony of aggravated kidnapping. That's what
we're here to try and that's what we'll let a jury decide is whether or not that occurred." (R.
473:8). Defendant's own counsel stressed that it was "a first degree felony" (R463:15), and
that "this is an extremely serious case for Mr. Pedockie . . . a first degree felony trial"
(R471:7-8, 12-13). Multiple defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge noted that
the case was sufficiently complicated to take from two to four days to try (R463:22;
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R465:143; R466;19; R470:31; R473:23, 26-27). At one point, the trial judge explained to
defendant that he was facing a "fairly serious charge[]", equated the charge to a murder
charge, and noted that when trial dates conflicted between this case and a murder case,
defendant's case was continued solely because it was not as old, not because it was less
serious (R467:128-34; R468:13-14; R476:42-43).
The record also demonstrates defendant's understanding of the possible punishments
he was facing. In addition to reviewing the penalties with the court at his first appearance
(R252), defendant was present at the March 27,2002, hearing at which the prosecutor twice
explained that an amended information was being filed to reflect "that this is a six, ten, or a
15 to life" offense and to ensure that defendant was aware of that (R463:16-18). Mr. Brass
noted that it was "the same charge, just with some additional language" and the court noted
that this was sufficient to "put him [defendant] on notice of the potential penalties involved"
(id.). In addition, defendant's written objection to the State's jury instructions demonstrates
his familiarity with the content of the charging statute, which expressly details the applicable
range of punishment (R355). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3) (1999). Add. C. Several
times during the proceedings, defendant noted the seriousness of the charge and commented
that his life was on the line here (R352; R464:13; R468:56-8; R473:5,8). At one point,
defendant knowledge of Utah's sentencing scheme and his grasp of the potential criminal
punishments showed when he commented that if he had threatened various witnesses as he
claims the prosecutor did, he would "be charged with one to 15 witness tampering" (R476:
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16). That sentencing familiarity is understandable in light of his prison experience, which
was discussed at several points in the trial court (R25,94; R168-83; R194-217; R315-16;
R366-67; R466:7-8; R470:14-23, 28-29;R464:12-13; R477:l 1-14; R478:5-7).
Accordingly, the record supports a determination that defendant understood the nature
of the charge, the potential penalties, and the disadvantages of self-representation, rendering
his waiver of counsel knowing and intelligent.
2. Defendant's dilatory conduct and his ability to retain counsel establish
the functional equivalent of a knowing and intentional waiver
Alternatively, where the waiver of the right to counsel occurs through a defendant's
dilatory conduct, and especially where that conduct is accompanied by a refusal to proceed
pro se, the specifics of defendant's conduct itself may amount to the functional equivalent
of a knowing and intelligent waiver, regardless of whether the trial court did more than warn
defendant that his continued conduct would result in pro se representation. See Moore, 706
F.2d at 540; Brickert, 673 N.E.2d at 496. Defendant's conduct in this case was sufficiently
egregious to amount to a knowing and intentional waiver.
Two factors in this case combine to permit a determination that the functional
equivalent of a knowing and intentional waiver of counsel existed here, even absent an
express colloquy: 1) defendant's ability to retain counsel; and 2) defendant's repeatedly
obstructive and dilatory behavior.
First, where a defendant is financially able to retain counsel but refuses to do so, he
waives the right to counsel at trial, especially where defendant's conduct "can only be
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interpreted as an [intentional] attempt to frustrate the judicial process and avoid being
brought to trial." Brickert, 673 N.E.2d at 496; see also Bauer, 956 F.2d at 695 ("the
combination of ability to pay for counsel plus refusal to do so does waive the right to counsel
at trial") (emphasis in original).
We think it clear that although a defendant able to retain counsel is entitled to
a reasonable time to secure counsel, he may not indefinitely postpone trial by
continued applications for more time to seek representation. Whether
additional time should be granted is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Further, where a defendant able to retain counsel has been advised by
the court that he must retain counsel by a certain reasonable time, and where
there is no showing why he has not retained counsel within that time, the court
may treat his failure to provide for his own defense as a waiver of his right to
counsel and require such defendant to proceed to trial without an attorney.
United States v.Arlen, 252 F.2d 491,494 (2nd Cir. \95%)\ see also United States v. Gates, 557
F.2d 1086, 1087 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant's delaying tactics during the three months
between his arrest and the date of trial, and his request for additional time to secure retained
counsel on the day of trial amount to a waiver of defendant's right to counsel), cert denied,
434 U.S. 1017 (1978); Siniard, 491 So.2d at 1063-64 (where a defendant is able to retain
counsel and is given a reasonable time to do so, "he may not indefinitely postpone trial by
continued applications for more time to seek representation") (quoting Arlen, 252 F.2d at
494); Tarumoto, 614 P.2d at 399 (failure to obtain counsel after having ample opportunity
to do so amounts to an unequivocal and deliberate rejection of counsel and waiver of the
right to counsel); Williams, 440 N.E.2d at 847 (when a defendant who is financially able to
retain counsel has been told to do so, has been given a reasonable amount of time to do so,

37

then fails to do so without any reasonable cause, "the court may treat such a failure as a
waiver of the right to counsel and require him to proceed" pro se); Brickert, 673 N.E.2d at
496 (a warning that defendant would be required to proceed pro se if he did not obtain
counsel before trial is so obvious as to be unnecessary, and a defendant who "continuously
represented" that he would obtain an attorney after he refused to cooperate with three courtappointed attorneys who ultimately withdrew will, by his conduct, be deemed to have
unequivocally waived his right to counsel, even absent a discussion of the dangers of selfrepresentation); Colbert v. State, 714 P.2d 209, 211 (Ok. Cr. App. 1986) ("A defendant's
failure to hire an attorney may constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to
counsel if it was done to delay the trial of his case."); State v. Schmick, 660 P.2d 693, 696
(Or. App. 1983) ("A defendant's right to retain counsel of his choice must, after a reasonable
opportunity to exercise that right, be balanced against the state's need to conclude the case
in a timely manner").4
In this case, defendant had sufficient resources, multiple warnings, and ample time
to retain counsel for the fifth trial setting, and his failure to do so occurred without reasonable
justification. Defendant possessed "significant resources to hire private counsel" despite his

4

While the same result has been found in cases involving appointed counsel, the
issue is not relevant to the decision in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Fazzini, 871
F.2d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 1989) ("a defendant who refused to cooperate with numerous
appointed counsel, who was warned of the consequences of his failure to cooperate would
have, and who insisted, despite his conduct, that he was not waiving his right to appointed
counsel" was properly found to have "knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
appointed counsel").
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vacillation between demanding appointed counsel and demanding time to retain counsel
(R299-300; R469:8-9; R472:2; R473:17-22, 27-29; R474:9-10,13-14; R459:6). The trial
court warned defendant multiple times after the fourth trial date was stricken that the next
setting would be that last, no further continuances would be permitted for counsel, and if
defendant appeared without retained counsel, he would be required to proceed to trial as
scheduled without the benefit of counsel (R471:15-16; R473:4,7,20-21,32; R476:6,19-20;
R477:7-9; R478:2). The court also warned defendant countless times that his continued
insistence on counsel who would file motions they believed to be frivolous would leave him
without counsel and would ultimately require that he defend himself at trial (R304; R468:56,9,11-12; R473:5-6,12-16,18,29; R474:9-10; R476:2-5,9,l 1-12,29; R477:4-9; R479:5-8;
R459:5-6).
Despite the warnings, defendant appeared for trial without counsel, arguing once
again that he was unable to represent himself, dragging the court through his version of the
procedural history of the case, and repeatedly invoking his right to counsel (R459:1-20). He
offered no new reason, justifiable or otherwise, to explain the absence of retained counsel,
and he insisted upon removal of standby counsel (R459:13-20).
The trial judge did all he could to ensure that defendant had ample time and ample
warning of the need for counsel before requiring that he represent himself. The record is
clear that the only reason retained counsel did not appear is because of defendant's continued
insistence that counsel file and argue motions they felt were meritless. Where the absence
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of counsel on the day of trial was solely the fault of defendant's repetitive dilatory conduct,
and where defendant offered no new or reasonable basis for the absence of retained counsel,
the trial judge could properly treat his pro se appearance as the functional equivalent of a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. See United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d
635, 642 (7th Cir. 1989) ('"So long as the district court has given the defendant sufficient
opportunity to retain the assistance of appointed counsel, defendant's actions which have the
effect of depriving himself of appointed counsel will establish a knowing and intentional
choice."); Brickert, 673 N.E.2d at 496.
In addition to the defendant's ability, opportunity and failure to retain counsel, the trial
court had before it defendant's persistent and prolonged dilatory conduct over the twenty-one
months leading up to trial. There can be no doubt that defendant's conduct hindered the
efficient administration ofjustice. His concerted efforts to frustrate the trial judge's attempts
to conduct a trial with defense counsel are evident throughout the record.
Insistence on a non-existent right to puppet counsel and rejection of pro se
representation-The right to counsel does not include the right to a particular counsel, to
puppet counsel, or to counsel who atgrees with defendant's particular views of the law. See
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983); Weninger, 624 F.2d at 166 (defendant is not
entitled to counsel who shares defendant's political ideals). One able to retain counsel may
obtain counsel is constitutionally entitled only to competent counsel. See Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); Moore, 706 F.2d at 538.
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Defendant claimed adnauseum that he did not waive his right to counsel and that he
did not want to represent himself (R103,253,241,317-19,357; R468:2-3,5,8; R471:3,ll;
R473:12-13,20,28; R474:ll; R476:13; R477:3-4,6,8-10,16; R478:3-5; R479:3-8; 459:
7,13,19-20). Yet all his actions contradicted his words and brought about his pro se
representation at trial. He insisted "adequate" counsel was counsel who would file and argue
his pre-trial motions, despite the consensus of those with whom he spoke that the motions
were frivolous and could not ethically be filed (R468:2-5,7-8; R473:2,5-6,9-11,14-15,17,23;
R.477:5-6). The trial judge explained countless times at no fewer than seven hearings that
defendant was not entitled to counsel who would act unethically, that counsel could not be
forced to file frivolous motions, and that defendant's persistence in rejecting counsel because
they would not file his motions would result in his self-representation at trial (R304; R468:56,9,ll-12;R473:5-6,12-16,18,29;R474:9-10;R476:2-5,9,ll-12,29;R477:4-7^
R459:5-6). Defendant acknowledged the warnings, then repeatedly ignored them, choosing
instead to insist on the right to "adequate" counsel (R467:31-32; R468:ll; R469:6,8;
R473:15,17; R459:20).

That insistence resulted in his self-representation at trial.

Defendant's conduct made it impossible for him to obtain counsel.
Vacillation between appointed and retained counsel-Defendant went through three
PDA attorneys before raising his ability to retain counsel at the November 29,2001, hearing
(R6-7,82,3 89; R467:12-13). When defendant fired his third PDA attorney, he refused further
representation by PDA, announced that his father "has money and everything," and claimed
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thathewouldretainEdBrass(R1175118-19,1215318?389;R469:2-358-9;R472:2).Mr.Brass
later withdrew and indicated that defendant would retain new counsel (Rl 84-85,190; R471:215). Mr. Caine then appeared and assured the court that defendant could afford to retain
counsel and would do so (R222,330; R472:2). Thereafter, defendant asked to speak with
PDA (R229; R473:17-19), rejected their representation (R300; R473:18-19,22; R459:6), had
PDA appointed as standby counsel (R300; R473:19-20,21,27-29), retained then fired Paul
Grant (R232-3 5,23 8-40), asked for PDA (R474:9-10,14), again rejected PDA (R459:13-20),
claimed that the trial court refused his repeated requests to appoint "proper counsel"
(R241,317,319,352,353,357;R479:3),claimedheneverrejectedPDA(R459:7), and claimed
he could not afford an attorney (R477:6; R479:3,7).5 Further, despite his written letter and
his repeated admissions that he fired Mr. Retallick, defendant later claimed that he did not
fire even one attorney (Rl 17,121; R469:2; R479:5).
Irrational pursuit of pre-trial motions—Defendant's dilatory tactics are tied
inextricably to his multiple motions, which he deemed "critical," "crucial," and "very
necessary" to his case (R468:8; R473:29,32; R476: 8). He had prepared a motion to dismiss
and a discovery request as early as the preliminary hearing, and his motions multiplied
thereafter (R26-27;82,241-47,252-54,317-20,350-56,386-88;R465:145-46,149-50;R467:1415,32,126; R468:18-19 R474:4,5,10-l 1,13-14; R476:4,9-10,14-17). Defendant's main

5

The pattern continued after trial, with defendant filing an affidavit of
impecuniosity (R435), retaining counsel for sentencing (R441), then appearing with
appointed counsel (R443,448).
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complaints involved: an inability to receive a fair trial, which required a change of venue
(R253-54; R467:14-15,18; R468:ll; R474:4-5,10-ll,14; R476:15,25; R477:6; R478:7);
violation of his statutory speedy trial right (R248-51; R467:138-40; R468:12; R469:5-6;
R470:31-32; R471:10-ll; R472:5; R473:4; R476:30-34,40-45); and dismissal due to
prosecutorial misconduct (R241-47,253; R467:15; R468:17,23; R473:passim; R474:4-5,11;
R476:6,9-10,14-16,22-26; R477:7; R479:3-4). He was told by the court and counsel
repeatedly that the motions were frivolous, yet he insisted that his various counsel file his
motions and that his own signature be on them (R465:149-50; R467:16-18,125-28; R468:23,5; R471:ll; R473:passim; R474:3-4,12; R476:l-14,18-19; R477:4,6-7).
In an effort to resolve the apparent barriers to trial, the trial judge ultimately required
that defendant present his own motions, then denied them (R94-95,167,304-05,321-34;
R476:passim). He explained, as had Mr. Retallick, that some were more properly addressed
by other means (R304-05,324; R468:7-8,17-19; R473:9-10; R474:11,23; R476:20-21,2528,30,40). However, defendant refused to accept either the judge's rulings or his advice.
Instead, he continued to resist proceeding to trial, seeking to submit the motions to another
judge or to retain counsel to re-file them (R229; R473:4,7-8,11,14,24; R474:10; R476:10,1921;R479:4).
Various demands designed to maximize delay-Defendant did not stop at merely
insisting that counsel argue his motions. He timed his demands to permit for the maximum
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amount of delay possible, at the same time almost always refusing to waive, even
temporarily, his statutory speedy trial right (R.459:18).
-Defendant appeared in court on August 1,2001—eight working days before
the scheduled trial—and sought and received a continuance to permit his
public defender to file and argue his "initial motions" (R466:6,18-21,24).
Despite his express agreement on the record at the hearing, he later claimed the
continuance was without his consent (R467:139-40).
-He later appeared in court on January 9,2002, to remove PDA from his case
for not filing his motions, only to change his mind when he found he would
have to proceed pro se (R 103-04,318,389; R468:2-9; R474:13; R476:2;
R477:5). Knowing the delay he suffered with prison mail, the next day he
wrote a letter that reached the court nine days later-ten working days before
the scheduled trial date—to remove PDA, assert his ability to retain counsel,
and seek a continuance to permit retained counsel to familiarize himself with
the case (R117-19,389; R469:2-3; R463:12-15; R473:30-31). By the time
defendant's new attorney appeared and obtained a continuance, only three
working days remained until trial (R463:passim).
-Retained counsel, Mr. Brass, represented defendant for two months with no
apparent problem. He appeared with defendant in court on April 10 with no
indication of any difficulty between them (R165,167; R470:passim).
However, two days later-the last working day before trial-Mr. Brass sought
to withdraw based on an "ethical" conflict involving defendant's motions and
which prevented him from remaining as standby counsel (Rl 84-85,19091,330-31; R471:2-15). The trial was rescheduled.
The repeated pattern of hiring and firing counsel within days of a trial setting and of
seeking repeated continuances to locate "adequate" counsel was more than mere coincidence.
Right up until trial occurred on the fifth setting, defendant was seeking time to retain
"adequate" counsel, despite the fact that such counsel had not been found and many of the
motions had been filed, argued, and denied (R241-54,304-05,321-34; R476:passim;
R459:7,13,19-20).
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Refusal to accept the warned consequences of his conduct or to prepare for
trial-While insisting on the right to puppet counsel, defendant continued to reject any
possibility that his conduct would result in his need to represent himself at trial.
-The trial judge repeatedly warned him that the absence of counsel at the fifth
trial setting would result in self-representation (R471:15-16; R473:4,7,2021,32; R476:6,19-20; R.477:7-9; R478:2). Defendant claimed he understood
the admonition, then appeared without counsel (R471:16; R473:4,10;
R477:14-15; R478:6-7; R459:2-3).
-The trial judge explicitly warned him seven weeks before trial that he should
contact standby counsel soon to start the subpoena process (R305;R476:1618,27-28). Defendant waited until two working days before trial to do so,
resulting in his having at trial only those defense witnesses the State had
subpoenaed for its case (R459:15). He then blamed standby counsel for the
situation (R459:4).
-More than four weeks before trial, the trial judge warned defendant that he
needed to prepare and submit his voir dire questions and jury instructions to
the court in writing (R477:16; R478:2-5). Defendant submitted no voir dire
questions and claimed surprise at trial that he would not be permitted to
question the panel himself (R459:10-l 1,15-16). He expressly refused to
submit the jury instructions standby counsel had prepared for him (R479:23,11; R459:15-16). In the mean time, he filed a written pro se objection to the
State's proposed instructions (R479:2).
Refusal to accept responsibility for any but minimal delay-Defendant repeatedly
demonstrated that he was willing to say whatever was necessary to delay the case and shift
blame awayfromhimself.
-At the motion hearing on August 13,2002, defendant attempted to delay the
hearing by pointing out that his witnesses were not there (R476:7). He first
blamed their absence on the court, noting that the hearing had originally been
scheduled a day earlier, so the witnesses were not there "due to the fact that
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it's not the right day" (R476: 7).6 When the court noted that no one had
appeared the previous day, defendant blamed their absence on the fact that
"[t]hey're scared to come because of retaliations [threatened by the prosecutor
and state's investigator]" (R475:4-5; R476:7,26).7 Still later in the same
hearing, he changed his mind again and claimed they would appear the next
day (R476:26-27). Moreover, despite the fact that the witnesses at issue were
defendant's friends and family, defendant claimed, "I don't know all their
names or addresses[,]" suggesting he had never secured their presence in the
first place and blaming it on prison restrictions (R476:22-23,26).8 In this one
hearing, defendant revealed his intent to manipulate the situation to delay the
trial.
-Defendant again demonstrated his intent to delay the proceedings once the
motion deadlines were set on May 29. Paul Grant filed an appearance as
defense counsel on June 13, then executed a motion to withdraw three days
later, reciting that defendant had fired him (R232,23 8). The trial court granted
the motion by order dated June 27 (R240). Defendant knew before the hearing
that his counsel was withdrawing and did nothing for several weeks until he
was scheduled to appear in court. He then falsely pleaded ignorance about
counsel's withdrawal and attempted to blame the absence of substitute counsel
on that ignorance. Predictably, he then sought more time from the court to do
what he could have been doing over the previous few weeks: finding counsel
(R474:4,8-9,13).
-Defendant insisted whenever possible that he was responsible for only one
counsel's withdrawal, blaming his lack of counsel instead on the system, the
prosecutor and PDA for failing to provide him with the "adequate" counsel to
which he was entitled (R.318-20; R467:14-15,127,138-39; R468:2-4;
R469:4,9-10; R471:10; R474:12-13; R459:6,9).

6

The prison failed to transport defendant on August 12, so the trial judge
rescheduled the hearing for August 13 (R303-05; R475:2).
7

Defendant earlier told the court that his witnesses were "more than willing to
come" (R474:5).
8

Despite supposedly not knowing their addresses, defendant was able to get
affidavits from two of them before trial (R244-47). Moreover, he earlier claimed that the
witnesses were "more than willing" to come to court to testify (R474:5).
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-Defendant blamed all the delay occurring after November 29, 2001, on the
prosecutor's continuance of the December 10 trial setting because of a conflict
with a murder trial, claiming the continuance violated his statutory speedy trial
rights and warranted dismissal of the charge (R82-83,248-51,319; 468:12-16;
469:10-11; 470:31-33; R471:5-6;R476:31-32,40-43; R459:12-13).
Contradictory conduct evidencing intentional delay-In addition to insisting on an
imaginary right to counsel he could not find while refusing to prepare for the possibility of
self-representation in the face of the trial court's admonitions, defendant exhibited other
contradictory conduct which supported the trial court's determination of a valid waiver of
the right to counsel.
-Defendant invoked his statutory speedy trial right and eventually filed a
motion to dismiss for a perceived violation of that right. At the same time, he
actively worked to delay the trial, explaining that once a timely trial did not
occur, he "couldn't really care less if it [the trial] goes" because he was entitled
to a dismissal of the charges (R469:5-6; R471:10-l 1). The trial court twice
listened to defendant's arguments and twice rejected them (R94-95,167,32134; R467:128-40; R470:31-33; R472:5-6; R473:2-6; R476:30). Defendant
refused to accept the trial court's ruling, seeking instead to put his failed
motions before other judges or to resubmit them through retained counsel
(R229; R473:4,7-8,l 1,14,24; R474:10; R476:10,19-21; R479:4). He knew
twenty seven days remained in the statutory period by the court's calculation,
yet chose to continue his dilatory tactics instead of pursing trial (R268,332).
-Defendant waited until more than two months after the preliminary hearing
before he began to complain that it was untimely, later including the allegation
in his motions and claiming a right to a new preliminary hearing (R184;
R466:9-10; R467:138; R471:3-4; R476:45-46).
-Seven weeks before the fifth trial setting, defendant was informed of a
stipulation Mr. Brass had signed before he withdrew permitting a proffer at
trial of foundation for business records in lieu of bringing witnesses from out
of state (R218-19,305,315-16; R476:46-48). The court gave defendant a week
to review the stipulation with standby counsel (R475:48). Defendant later

47

summarily objected to the stipulation simply because it involved the State's
witnesses (R477:2-3,18).
-Defendant repeatedly asserted that he was not responsible for any withdrawal
of counsel prior to Mr. Retallick, his third PDA counsel, in January 2002
(EG 18; R467:14-15; R468:2-4; R469:9-10; R474:12-13). However, he
ultimately admitted that neither of the first two PDA counsel would file his
motions and that he wanted the PDA off his case before the May 2001
preliminary hearing because of it (R53,253; R464:12; R467:16,127,149;
R469:3-8; R473:6; R474:4-5; R477:5; R459:6,9).
-After Mr. Caine appeared with defendant on April 1, 2002, to explain that
defendant intended to retain counsel, defendant failed to find a single attorney
who would appear in court on his behalf. At the same time, defendant
repeatedly refused representation from PDA, even though PDA was ultimately
appointed as standby counsel (R300; R473:17-22,27-29; R459:6).
-Defendant sought removal of his standby counsel immediately prior to
seating a jury, then stated thereafter that he did not fire him (R459:13-20).

Defendant's ability to retain counsel, his ample opportunity to do so, and his
responsibility for the absence of counsel at the final trial setting and for the withdrawal of
all previously-retained counsel independently gives rise to the functional equivalent of a
knowing and intentional waiver by conduct of the right to counsel. See Bauer, 956 F.2d at
695; FazzinU 871 F.2d at 642.
In any event, that course of conduct together with defendant's remaining pervasive
conduct, aimed at obstructing all efforts by the trial judge to move this case to trial with
defense counsel, fully supports the trial court's decision that defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel. The trial court went to great lengths to provide
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defendant with every opportunity to take advantage of the right to counsel, to have the
concerns in his motions addressed, and to avoid self-representation. The judge carefully and
repeatedly reviewed with defendant his right to counsel, explaining what it did and did not
entail and warning him repeatedly that his failure to listen to counsel would result in his
having to go to trial representing himself. Defendant's pertinacious conduct left that court
with the conviction that defendant was intentionally holding the system captive, playing a
game and trying to prevent the matter from going to trial at all (R331; R473:l 1,18,20-21;
R479:5-8; R459:7,9,l 1,218). With the integrity of the criminal system and the instant
prosecution at stake, the trial judge properly treated defendant's conduct as a knowing and
intentional waiver of the right to counsel. See Kelm, 827 F.2d at 1321-1323 (defendant's
dilatory conduct in refusing an appointed attorney, refusing to waive his right to counsel,
repeatedly delaying in retaining counsel, and imposing unreasonable restrictions on counsel
waived the right to counsel where the record reveals he understood the dangers of selfrepresentation).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
court of appeals' decision, find extraordinary circumstances to permit a de novo review of
the record, andfindthat, by his conduct, defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to counsel.
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OPINION
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
**1 Defendant Robert Pedockie appeals his
conviction of aggravated kidnapping, a first degree
felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated section
76-5-302 (1999). In particular, Defendant argues
that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss because the State had failed to bring him to
trial within 120 days in violation of Utah Code
Annotated section 77-29-1 (1999) (Speedy Trial
Statute); and (2) he was denied his state and federal
constitutional right to assistance of counsel when
the trial court determined that Defendant had
waived his right to counsel and required him to
represent himself. [FN1] We reverse and remand
for a new trial.
FN1. Defendant also argues that the trial
court deprived him of his right to trial by
an impartial jury when it gave a lengthy
statement
to
the
jury
explaining
Defendant's lack of counsel at trial.
Because we reverse and remand for a new
trial on other grounds, we do not address
this argument.
BACKGROUND
**2 On January 3, 2001, Defendant went to the
Ogden, Utah residence of his ex-girlfriend, Nicole
Sather (Nicole), with his cousin, Justin Pedockie
(Justin), and forced Nicole to accompany them on a
drive in Defendant's truck. Justin carried a loaded
rifle, and Defendant threatened to kill Nicole if she
did not comply. At a stop in Pay son, Utah, Nicole
attempted to flee in Defendant's truck but she was
shot at by Justin and ultimately stopped by
Defendant. Later that day, Defendant dropped
Justin off in Salt Lake City and then took Nicole to
her home in Ogden where the two went inside and
fell asleep. The next morning, as Defendant drove
Nicole toward Park City, Utah, he threatened to kill
her and then himself. At a stop for gas near Park
City, Nicole slipped away from Defendant with help
from one of the gas station clerks.
**3 Defendant was charged with aggravated
kidnapping. At Defendant's initial appearance on
February 20, 2001, the Honorable Pamela G.
Heffernan appointed an attorney from the Weber
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County Public Defenders' Association (PDA) to
represent *1185 him. Defendant's first PDA
attorney was Michael Bouwhuis, who was released
from representing Defendant because he was
actively representing two of the State's main
witnesses. Defendant was then represented by a
second PDA attorney, Michael Boyle. A
preliminary hearing was set for April 13, 2001.
However, at a hearing on April 10, 2001, Judge
Heffernan recused herself from the case, and it was
reassigned to the Honorable Ernie W. Jones, who
set a preliminary hearing for May 25, 2001.
**4 Defendant requested a 120-day disposition of
his case pursuant to the Speedy Trial Statute, and on
April 10, 2001, the Division of Institutional
Operations at the Utah State Prison received the
written notice. The trial court attempted to
schedule trial for July 12, 2001, but defense counsel
was not available until early August. Accordingly,
Judge Jones bound Defendant over for trial.
**5 At a pretrial conference on August I, 2001,
trial was reset for December 10, 2001 at
Defendant's request. Thus, Defendant waived his
right to a 120-day disposition as to this continuance.
**6 At a pretrial motion hearing on November 29,
2001, Defendant was represented by a third PDA
attorney, James Retallick, because Boyle's contract
with Weber County had been terminated. The
prosecutor requested a continuance of the trial date
on the grounds that she had a murder trial set for
December 10 in a case that predated Defendant's
case. Retallick was prepared to go to trial on
December 10. However, the trial judge found good
cause for granting the continuance and issued
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on
December 3, 2001. The trial court attempted to
reschedule trial for January 7, 2002, and January
14, 2002, but defense counsel was unavailable.
Trial was then reset for February 4, 2002.
**7 At a pretrial conference on January 9, 2002,
Retallick indicated that Defendant had requested
that he be terminated from Defendant's case because
Retallick refused to file motions that Defendant
insisted be filed. In particular, Retallick stated that
Defendant wanted him to file motions regarding,
inter alia, prosecutorial misconduct, 120-day
disposition, and change of venue. Retallick had

explained to Defendant that he did not have grounds
to file these particular motions and that he found the
motions to be "absolutely frivolous." Defendant
stated that he wanted counsel who would follow his
direction and file the motions he requested.
**8 The trial judge explained to Defendant that
while he had a right to counsel, he did not have a
right to counsel of his choice from PDA. The trial
judge further explained that if Defendant did not
want to accept the advice of Retallick, then he could
either hire his own attorney or represent himself.
Defendant indicated that he wanted Retallick to
continue to represent him. At the end of the
hearing, the court confirmed that the trial would go
forward on February 4.
**9 On January 23, 2002, the trial court held a
hearing addressing the issue of Defendant's counsel.
Both the court and Retallick had received letters
from Defendant requesting that Retallick be
removed from the case. At the hearing, Defendant
reiterated his desire to have PDA released from his
case and indicated that he had hired a private
attorney, Ed Brass, to represent him. The court
allowed PDA to withdraw from representing
Defendant. Defendant requested that the trial be
continued so that Brass could prepare for trial. At a
subsequent hearing on January 30, 2002, the court
granted Defendant's request for a continuance and
set the trial for April 15, 2002.
**10 In a telephone conference three days before
trial, Brass informed the court that he could no
longer represent Defendant because of an "ethical
issue." The court allowed Brass to withdraw from
the case and explained to Defendant that once the
trial was reset, the court would not allow any further
continuances. Specifically, the court stated, "I want
[you] to understand, I'm not [going to] continue this
case again.... I don't care what your excuse or
reason is, you either get an attorney who will
represent you on the matter or you're just [going to]
represent yourself next time it's scheduled."
**11 At another pretrial conference on May 1,
2002, Defendant indicated that he was in the
process of hiring an attorney from Provo but that
the attorney had not yet agreed to *1186 take his
case. At Defendant's request, the court set another
pretrial conference for May 29, 2002. At that
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hearing, Defendant appeared pro se and indicated
that he had been unable to retain private counsel
because the attorneys he had contacted believed that
it was unethical to file the motions that he wanted
filed.
**12 The court again informed Defendant that if
he was unwilling to follow the advice of counsel,
then he would have to represent himself. Defendant
stated that he was not capable of representing
himself and that he desired counsel. The court
informed Defendant that if PDA was appointed
again, it was final, and Defendant could not then
retain private counsel. Defendant indicated that he
did not want PDA to represent him because he
intended to retain counsel.
**13 The court appointed PDA as standby counsel
and informed Defendant that he could still retain
private counsel. The court cautioned Defendant
that there would be no further continuances and
scheduled the trial for September 30, 2002.
**14 Defendant subsequently filed three motions:
motion for a change of venue, motion to dismiss for
prosecutorial misconduct, and motion to dismiss for
violation of the Speedy Trial Act. A pretrial motion
hearing was set for July 31, 2002. At the hearing,
Defendant stated that he had hired Paul Grant as his
attorney. On June 13, 2002, Paul Grant had entered
an appearance of counsel for Defendant. However,
Grant had moved to withdraw because after meeting
with Defendant at the Utah State Prison, Defendant
"told counsel that he does not want counsel to be his
attorney of record." The court allowed Grant to
withdraw. After the court determined that Grant
was no longer Defendant's attorney, Defendant
requested representation, and the court again
appointed PDA to represent him.
**15 The pretrial motion hearing was rescheduled
for August 12, 2002, but because the prison failed
to transport Defendant, the hearing was reset for the
following day. Martin V. Gravis from PDA
appeared on behalf of Defendant. The court
informed Gravis that he was to act as standby
counsel for Defendant. At the August 13, 2002
hearing, Defendant expressed his belief that the
court had appointed PDA to represent him and
again stated that he was not capable of representing
himself. The court explained to Defendant that he
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would not be granted any more continuances and
must argue his motions at that time. Defendant
initially refused because he wanted an attorney to
argue his motions and Gravis, as standby counsel,
would not. The court explained to Defendant that
Gravis was available to assist Defendant with legal
issues but that Gravis was not going to argue his
motions. Further, the court again informed
Defendant that if Defendant wanted an attorney to
represent him, he must follow that attorney's advice
or represent himself. Defendant agreed to argue his
motions as long as the record reflected Defendant's
desire to have an attorney argue his motions and his
objection to self-representation. The court denied
all three motions.
**16 At another pretrial hearing on August 21,
2002, Defendant again objected to representing
himself and requested that counsel be appointed.
Gravis again was present as standby counsel. The
court again informed Defendant that he was not
going to appoint another public defender because
the court had "appointed several public defenders,
[and] they've always asked to be recused because
[Defendant] want[s] them to do something that's
illegal that's a violation of the Canons of Ethics."
**17 At the final pretrial conference on September
18, 2002, Defendant reiterated his desire to have
counsel appointed. The court again stated that it
was not going to appoint another attorney because
Defendant refused to follow the advice of counsel.
Defendant stated that he believed the court was
denying him access to counsel.
**18 At trial on September 30, 2002, Defendant
again asked for counsel. The court found that
Defendant "knowingly and intelligently waived
[his] right to an attorney in this matter." Prior to
seating the jury, Defendant complained that Gravis
had refused to subpoena witnesses. The court again
explained that Gravis did not represent Defendant
but was only present to assist him with *1187 legal
issues such as jury selection. Defendant requested
that Gravis be excused because "I was told by
[Gravis] himself that he wasn't gonna argue
anything, he wasn't gonna do anything." The court
granted Defendant's request and released Gravis.
**19 Following trial, the jury convicted Defendant
of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced
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him to an indeterminate term of ten years to life in
prison, to be served consecutively with a sentence
he was already serving. Defendant appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1] **20 We address two of Defendant's
arguments on appeal. First, Defendant argues that
the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
under the Speedy Trial Statute. " 'We review a trial
court's determination that a defendant's charges
should be dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial
Statute for abuse of discretion.1 " State v.
Hankerson, 2003 UT App 433,1 7, 82 P.3d 1155
(quoting State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 28l,1f 3,
34 P.3d 790). "An appellate court will find abuse of
discretion only where there is no reasonable basis in
the record to support the trial court's Speedy Trial
Statute determination of good cause." Id.
(quotations and citations omitted).
[2] [3] **21 Second, Defendant argues that he was
denied his state and federal constitutional rights to
counsel when the trial court determined that
Defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived his right to counsel through his conduct and
required Defendant to represent himself at trial.
"Whether a waiver of counsel was made knowingly
and intelligently is a mixed question of law and
fact." State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah
1998). "Thus, we review the trial court's factual
findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions for
correctness." State v. Vancleave, 2001 UT App 228,
t 5, 29 P.3d 680 (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. Speedy Trial Statute
[4] **22 Defendant argues that the trial court erred
by denying his motion to dismiss under the Speedy
Trial Statute. [FN2] When any Utah prisoner has
an "untried indictment or information" and files a
written demand "requesting disposition of the
pending charge," that prisoner "shall be entitled to
have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of
the date of delivery" of the written demand. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999). However, a
"reasonable continuance" to extend the statutory
period may be granted to either party "for good
cause shown in open court." Id. § 77-29- 1(3).
Should the prosecutor fail to bring the charge within
120 days, the defendant may move to dismiss the
charge against him. See id. § 77-29- 1(4). After
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reviewing the proceeding, "[i]f the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the
matter heard within the time required is not
supported by good cause, whether a previous
motion for continuance was made or not, the court
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice." Id.
FN2. The Speedy Trial Statute provides, in
relevant part:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term
of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or
other penal or correctional institution of
this state, and there is pending against the
prisoner in this state any untried indictment
or information, and the prisoner shall
deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial
officer in authority, or any appropriate
agent of the same, a written demand
specifying the nature of the charge and the
court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the pending charge, he shall
be entitled to have the charge brought to
trial within 120 days of the date of delivery
of written notice.
(3) After written demand is delivered as
required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting
attorney or the defendant or his counsel,
for good cause shown in open court, with
the prisoner or his counsel being present,
may
be
granted
any
reasonable
continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought
to trial within 120 days, or within such
continuance as has been granted, and
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss
the action, the court shall review the
proceeding. If the court finds that the
failure of the prosecuting attorney to have
the matter heard within the time required is
not supported by good cause, whether a
previous motion for continuance was made
or not, the court shall order the matter
dismissed with prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999).
*1188 [5] **23 Determining whether the trial
court erred in denying Defendant's motion to
dismiss pursuant to the Speedy Trial Statute
requires a two-step analysis. See State v. Coleman,
2001 UT App 28l,1f 6, 34 P.3d 790. "First, we
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must determine when the 120-day period
commenced and when it expired. Second, if the
trial was held outside the 120-day period, we must
then determine whether 'good cause' excused the
delay." State v. Beaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah
1998).
**24 The parties agree that the 120-day period
commenced on April 10, 2001. Thus, the statutory
period expired on August 8, 2001. Defendant's
four-day trial beginning on September 30, 2002,
was held well beyond the expiration of the 120-day
period. Therefore, we must determine whether
good cause excused the delay that caused
Defendant's trial to be held beyond the statutory
period. See id.
[6] **25 Defendant concedes that most of the
delays were supported by good cause but argues
that the trial court erred when it found good cause
to grant the State's request to continue the trial from
December 10, 2001, to February 4, 2002. [FN3]
We grant significant deference to a trial court's
finding of "good cause" and "find an abuse of
discretion only where there is no reasonable basis in
the record to support the trial court's Speedy Trial
Statute determination of good cause." State v.
Hankerson, 2003 UT App 433,f 7, 82 P.3d 1155
(quotations and citation omitted). Under this
standard, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it found good cause to
delay the trial.
FN3. Defendant asserts only that the delay
from December 10, 2001, to February 4,
2002-a period of 56 days—was not
supported by good cause. In addition,
Defendant does not challenge any trial
delays after February 4, 2002. Thus, we
address only the specific delay Defendant
challenges.
[7][8] **26 "A finding of 'good cause' that will
excuse failure of the prosecution to bring a
defendant to trial within the time required means (1)
delay caused by the defendant-such as asking for a
continuance; or (2) a relatively short delay caused
by unforseen problems arising immediately prior to
trial." State v. Houston, 2003 UT App 4l6,1f 11,
82 P.3d 219 (quotations and citations omitted); see
also State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah

1991). Furthennore, " 'extending the trial date to a
reasonable time outside the [120-day] period to
accommodate, in part, defense counsel's schedule
constitutes "good cause" under [the Speedy Trial
Statute].' " Houston, 2003 UT App 416 at ^ 11, 82
P.3d 219 (alterations in original) (quoting Heaton,
958P.2dat917).
**27 In State v. Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146,
71 P.3d 184, the trial court had found good cause to
delay defendant's jury trial beyond the 120-day
period "to hear a case of higher priority." Id. at \
11. We reversed and remanded with instructions to
dismiss the defendant's case with prejudice because
good cause was not shown in open court. See id at
1Hf 15-16. In particular, we held that the State
had failed to request that the trial court make its
good cause determination in open court pursuant to
section 77-29-1(3). See id at f 15. Further, in the
trial court's written order denying the defendant's
motion to dismiss, the court had failed to provide
any information regarding the higher priority case
so that we could adequately review the good cause
determination. See id. at ^ 16.
**28 Unlike the trial court in Wagenman, the trial
court in Defendant's case made a good cause
determination in open court pursuant to section
77-29-1(3) and made specific findings to support its
good cause determination. In particular, the trial
court found that good cause existed to grant the
State's motion to continue the trial from December
10, 2001, to February 4, 2002, because the
prosecutor had another high priority jury trial that
was scheduled for the same time as Defendant's
case. The trial court found that the State requested,
in open court, to continue the trial for the following
reasons: (1) the other case predated Defendant's
case; (2) the other defendant was also in custody;
(3) the other case was a first degree murder and
aggravated robbery case; (4) Defendant's trial
could not be rescheduled to an earlier date because
the State would be unable to secure out-of-state
witnesses prior to December 10; and (5) while the
trial court and the State were both available to try
the case the *1189 week of January 14, 2002,
defense counsel was available only the week of
February 4, 2002. Thus, the trial court concluded
that good cause existed to delay the trial until
February 4, 2002. These facts adequately provide a
reasonable basis for the trial court's finding of good
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cause to grant the State's motion to continue the trial
beyond the statutory period, and we find no abuse
of discretion in this determination.
**29 Furthermore, defense counsel's scheduling
conflicts delayed resetting the trial until February 4,
2002. Specifically, when the State moved to
continue the trial from December 10, 2001, the trial
court attempted to reset the trial for January 7, 2002
and even offered to move another trial to ensure the
trial was held in January. However, defense
counsel informed the trial court that he had already
scheduled trials during the weeks of January 7,
2002, and January 14, 2002. Defense counsel
suggested the week of January 21, 2002, and
offered to find someone to replace him at the trial
on January 14, but codefendant's counsel had
scheduling conflicts both of those weeks. Thus, the
trial was reset for February 4, 2002, in part, to
accommodate defense counsel's schedule. See
Houston, 2003 UT App 416 at If 11, 82 P.3d 219.
Because the trial court found that good cause
existed to grant the State's motion to continue, and
because defense counsel's scheduling conflicts
necessitated rescheduling the trial to February
rather than January, we hold that the trial court
properly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss.
[FN4]
FN4. The analysis required under the
Speedy Trial Statute is as follows: Once a
court determines that the trial falls outside
the 120-day limit, it then must determine
whether the cause for and extent of the
delay is wholly attributable to the
defendant. If so, then good cause exists
and no further analysis is necessary. If not,
then the court must engage in a more
traditional good
cause
analysis to
determine whether the extent of the delay
attributable to others occurred for good
cause.
While this is the required analysis, because
the case law may appear inconsistent
regarding whether a good cause analysis is
necessary when the delay beyond 120 days
is attributable solely to a defendant, we
briefly discuss the relevant cases.
In State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah
1998),
the
defendant
requested
a
preliminary hearing just ten days before

the trial date. See id. at 916. To
accommodate defendant's request, the trial
court moved the trial date and held a
preliminary hearing instead. See id. The
trial court then spent eighteen days
resolving defendant's motions. See id.
Without explicitly engaging in a traditional
good cause analysis, the Utah Supreme
Court held that the delay effectively
extended the 120-day deadline by eighteen
days. See id. The court then stated that
because the trial court had scheduled the
trial beyond the disposition period, which
included
the
eighteen-day
delay
attributable to the defendant, "we must
proceed to step two of our inquiry to
determine whether continuing the trial to
accommodate, in part, defense counsel's
schedule constitutes 'good cause1 under
section 77-29-1." Id.
The court did not explain why the first
delay (related to the defendant's request for
a preliminary hearing) did not seem to
trigger a traditional good cause analysis,
but the second delay (related, in part, to
the defendant's scheduling conflicts) did
trigger a traditional good cause analysis.
See id. This makes it appear that the
analysis is different for each delay.
However, there really is no difference.
Even though the court did not explicitly
engage in a traditional good cause analysis
for the first delay, it did hold that "the
disposition period must be extended by the
amount of time during which the prisoner
himself creates the delay." Id. (emphasis
added). Implicit in this holding is that
whenever a delay can be attributed wholly
to the defendant, good cause exists to
extend the 120-day deadline at least to that
extent. See State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d
115, 116 (Utah 1982) (concluding that
where defendant's trial date was originally
scheduled less than one month after
defendant's request for disposition and
court granted defendant's request for
continuance, defendant was responsible for
the number of days during which
continuance was granted and could not
include those days in disposition period).
The fact that the Heaton court engaged in a
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traditional good cause analysis only for the
second delay-which was caused only in
part by defense counsel's scheduling
conflicts and in part by the prosecutor's
scheduling conflicts, see 958 P.2d at 916does not demonstrate that the court did not
find good cause for the first delay. The
better reading is that while good cause is
required for all delays beyond the
disposition period, once the cause for and
extent of the delay is found to be wholly
attributable to the defendant, good cause
exists, and no further analysis is required.
Cases decided after Heaton are in accord.
For instance, in State v. Coleman, 2001
UT App 281, 34 P.3d 790, this court held
that good cause existed to delay a trial for
the time it took to adjudicate defendant's
motion to dismiss, see id. at f 11, and
defense counsel's scheduling conflicts. See
id. at \ 18. The fact that we used the
word
"tolling,"
which
is
only
metaphorically apt, to describe the
additional time added to the disposition,
see id. at \ 19 n. 14, does not change the
fact that good cause was required and
found.
Also, in State v. Peterson, 2002 UT App
53, 42 P.3d 1258, we stated that because
the defendant caused the delay by filing a
motion to suppress, " 'the disposition
period [should have been] extended by the
amount of time during which defendant
himself ... created delay.' " Id. at \ 8
(quoting State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115,
116 (Utah 1982)) (alterations in original).
Thus, we reversed the trial court's
dismissal for failure to prosecute and held
that twenty-seven days remained in the
disposition period. See id. at "J 9.
Although we did not explicitly engage in a
traditional good cause analysis and we
again used the somewhat misleading word
"tolling," id. at \ 6, Peterson supports the
rule that when the cause for and extent of
the delay is wholly attributable to
defendant, good cause exists for the delay.
Finally, in State v. Houston, 2003 UT App
416, 82 P.3d 219, we engaged in a
traditional good cause analysis because
while the delay was initially caused by

defense counsel's scheduling conflict, the
extent of the delay was in part due to
scheduling conflicts the trial court had.
See id. at f 13. We noted that, under
Heaton, "extending the trial date to a
reasonable time outside the [120-day]
period to accommodate ... defense
counsel's schedule constitutes good cause
under [the Speedy Trial Statute]." Id. at \
11 (first and third alterations in original)
(quotations and citation omitted); accord
State v. Hankerson, 2003 UT App 433, 82
P.3d 1155. Because the delay was not
unreasonable under the circumstances,
there existed good cause for the delay.
Houston, 2003 UT App 416 at K 13, 82
P.3d219.
*1190 II. Waiver of Right to Counsel
[9][10] **30 Defendant argues that the trial court
erred in finding that Defendant voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waived his state [FN5]
and federal rights to counsel through his conduct.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees every criminal defendant
the right to assistance of counsel as well as the right
to self-representation. See State v. Frampton, 131
P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987) ("In Faretta v.
California,[ All U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45
L.Ed.2d 562 (1975),] the United States Supreme
Court noted that the [S]ixth [A]mendment ...
implicitly guarantees the right of a competent
accused to represent himself, without counsel, in
state criminal proceedings." (footnotes omitted)).
FN5. Because Defendant does not set forth
a separate state constitutional argument,
we need only address the federal question.
See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247
n. 5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we
will not engage in state constitutional
analysis unless an argument for different
analyses under the state and federal
constitutions is briefed.").
[11][12] **31 However, "[b]ecause a defendant's
choice of self-representation often results in
detrimental consequences to the defendant, a trial
court must be vigilant to assure that the choice is
freely and expressly made 'with eyes open.' " State
v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45^ 15, 979 P.2d 799
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(quoting Faretta, All U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2525).
Thus, when there is doubt concerning the waiver
of counsel, a presumption against waiver exists and
any uncertainties must be resolved in the
defendant's favor. See State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d
911, 917 (Utah 1998).
[13][14][15] **32 To waive the right to counsel, a
defendant must "clearly and unequivocally" request
self-representation. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at If 16,
979 P.2d 799 (quotations and citations omitted).
Before honoring a defendant's decision to appear
pro se, a trial court must determine whether that
choice is being made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. See State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776,
779 (Utah Ct.App.1996). However, "[t]hese
requirements that the request to represent one's self
be definite and voluntary do not mean ... 'that [a
defendant's] decision to waive counsel must be
entirely unconstrained.' " Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at \
17, 979 P.2d 799 (second alteration in original)
(citations omitted). For instance, "[a] criminal
defendant may be asked, in the interest of orderly
procedures, to choose between waiver [of counsel]
and another course of action as long as the choice
presented to him is not constitutionally offensive."
Id. (second alteration in original) (quotations and
citations omitted). If the options presented are
constitutionally sound, then a defendant's choice
between or among them is voluntary. See id. at \
20.
**33 There is no question that Defendant in this
case did not explicitly request self-representation or
waive his right to counsel. At every appearance
before the trial court, Defendant insisted that he had
not waived his right to counsel and demanded
representation. The trial court repeatedly offered
Defendant the choice between accepting the
representation of appointed counsel, hiring private
counsel, or self-representation. Defendant rejected
representation from PDA because he claimed PDA
refused to file his *1191 motions. Essentially,
Defendant wanted counsel "strictly [to] follow
tactics dictated by" him. Id. at If 18.
[16] **34 After
representation because
directions by filing
unethical motions,
Defendant with the

Defendant rejected PDA
counsel would not follow his
what the attorney deemed
the trial court presented
choice of retaining private
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counsel or representing himself. While Defendant
made some attempts to hire an attorney, these
attempts were futile. "That [Defendant] did not
particularly like the choice presented to him ... and
that he did not want to proceed pro se are not
sufficient
reasons
to
render
the
choice
constitutionally offensive." Bakalov, 1999 UT 45
at 1f 21, 979 P.2d 799 (quotations and citations
omitted). Therefore, "[w]e hold that the options
offered
[Defendant
were
constitutionally
permissible and ... his choice, however reluctant or
conditional, was voluntary and unambiguous." Id.
at K 19 (emphasis added).
[17][18][19] **35 We must next consider whether
Defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and
intelligent. This inquiry " 'turns upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding each case.' " Id.
at H 22 (quoting State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183,
187 (Utah 1987)). The Utah Supreme Court has
highly "recommended that the trial court conduct an
on-the-record colloquy with the accused in which
the court should fully inform the accused 'of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so
that the record will establish that he knows what he
is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' "
[FN6] Id. at H 23 (quoting Faretta, All U.S. at
835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541). At a minimum, the trial
court should
FN6. The Utah Supreme Court has
repeatedly and strongly recommended, but
not mandated, that trial courts address
these areas using the sixteen-point
colloquy set forth in State v. Frampton,
131 P.2d 183, 187 n. 12 (Utah 1987). See
State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,1fl[ 23-24,
979 P.2d 799; State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d
911, 918 n. 5 (Utah 1998).
(1) advise the defendant of his constitutional right
to the assistance of counsel, as well as his
constitutional right to represent himself; (2)
ascertain that the defendant possesses the
intelligence and capacity to understand and
appreciate the consequences of the decision to
represent himself, including the expectation that
the defendant will comply with technical rules
and the recognition that presenting a defense is
not just a matter of telling one's story; and (3)
ascertain that the defendant comprehends the
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nature of the charges and proceedings, the range
of permissible punishments, and any additional
facts essential to a broad understanding of the
case.
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. Here, the State concedes
that the trial court did not engage in the requisite
colloquy. [FN7] Thus, we must determine whether
extraordinary circumstances exist that warrant a de
novo review of the record. See id. Neither the
supreme court nor this court has determined what
extraordinary circumstances would trigger de novo
review. However, we need not decide *1192
whether extraordinary circumstances exist to allow
us to look to the record as a whole to determine
whether Defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to counsel because there is simply
nothing in the record to persuade us that his waiver
was knowing and intelligent.
FN7. In fact, when prompted by the State
to engage in a colloquy with Defendant the
trial court refused.
[The State]: Judge, I think that we do need
to make a record under Heaton ... [a]nd
explain to [Defendant] all of those things
that are outlined under Heaton about law
school and rules of evidence, that you
won't help him, all of those kind of things.
Just to make sure that ... his election to
represent himself at the time of trial is
voluntary and knowing.
The Court: Well, but the problem is he
doesn't want to represent himself... But
every time he hires an attorney, the
attorney said I'm not going to do
something that's unethical, I won't
represent you anymore. That's the problem
we're running into. He doesn't want to
represent himself.
[The State]: But I think, Judge, that under
Heaton if you go through those options
and explain to him even absent all of those
things, absent any of the help, if he doesn't
have an attorney for the next trial setting
he will be representing himself and that
that's his election and otherwiseThe Court: Okay. But I guess the problem
I'm having-and I understand what you're
saying--but what good does it do to explain
to him the disadvantages of representing
himself? He doesn't want to represent
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himself. But on the other side, every time
we give him an attorney or have him hire
an attorney, the attorney withdraws on the
case.
[The State]: Because then at that point you
can force him to represent himself.
However, the trial court failed to follow
the State's recommendation.
**36 We conclude that even if extraordinary
circumstances exist warranting a de novo review,
while Defendant voluntarily waived his right to
counsel through his dilatory conduct, he did not do
so knowingly and intelligently. An examination of
the record reveals that Defendant understood that he
had a right to the assistance of counsel, as well as a
right to represent himself. Defendant invoked that
right at every hearing and incessantly asserted that
he did not want to represent himself because he was
not capable of doing so.
**37 Furthermore, Defendant
had some
comprehension of the procedures and practices
involved in a criminal trial. He understood that
counsel was necessary for preparing and arguing his
motions, for choosing the jury, presenting argument,
examining witnesses, subpoenaing witnesses, and
obtaining transcripts. Thus, even though Defendant
continually asserted that he was not capable of
representing himself, there is some evidence in the
record establishing that he possessed the
intelligence and capacity to represent himself.
However, we are not persuaded that without any
warnings from the trial court at any time as to the
inherent dangers of self-representation involving
such a serious offense, that he in fact understood the
consequences of representing himself. See id.
**38 Furthermore, there is nothing in the record
that would demonstrate Defendant's understanding
of the nature of the charge against him and the
range of possible punishments. The State argues
that the trial court's reading of the information at
Defendant's initial appearance is sufficient. We
disagree. There was no indication by Defendant at
this initial appearance that he understood the
severity of the charge or what punishments he was
likely facing. In fact, the record reveals that the
clerk of the court merely read the information and
that the trial court never engaged Defendant in a
discussion to determine his level of understanding.
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**39 In State v. Petty, 2001 UT App 396, 38 P.3d
998, the trial court engaged the defendant in a
limited colloquy but failed to address whether he
understood the nature of the charges and
proceedings and the range of possible punishments.
See id. at \ 7. Because the trial court made no
findings of fact, we examined the text of the limited
colloquy and held that we could "discern no
indication
of
[the
defendant's]
level
of
understanding concerning the nature of the charges
against him, or the range of possible penalties he
faced." Id. at ^ 11. Thus, we concluded that the
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive
his right to counsel. See id. Similarly, there are no
statements by Defendant anywhere in the record
that would indicate that he understood the nature of
the charge and range of possible punishments.
"Accordingly, absent a discussion of the nature of
the charges and the range of possible penalties
[Defendant] faced, we cannot say that [Defendant]
had a proper understanding of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation." Id. at f 8
(quotations and citations omitted).
**40 While we do not wish to reward Defendant's
dilatory conduct, in light of the strong presumption
against waiver, we hold that Defendant did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to
counsel. As our supreme court has recognized,
[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel in a
criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right
which must be jealously protected by the trial
court.... "The constitutional right of an accused to
be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the
protection of a trial court, in which the accused—
whose life or liberty is at stake-is without
counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious
and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of
determining whether there is an intelligent and
competent waiver by the accused."
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 (quoting *1193Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023,
82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). [FN8] Therefore, we hold
that while Defendant voluntarily waived his right to
counsel through his conduct, he did nol do so
knowingly and intelligently. Consequently, we
reverse Defendant's conviction and remand for a
new trial.

process had the trial judge advised
Defendant of the dire consequences of
refusing counsel who would not follow his
instructions. Specifically, when Defendant
initially indicated that he wanted Retallick
released from his case because he refused
to file the motions Defendant insisted be
filed, the judge could have explained to
Defendant the following: (1) counsel
cannot be forced to file motions he
believes to be frivolous; (2) if Defendant
continues to insist that frivolous motions
be filed and subsequent counsel is
removed from the case, then Defendant
would be required to represent himself;
(3) the serious nature of the charges he is
facing and the potential punishment; and
(4) because of the multiple dangers and
disadvantages
involved
in
self-representation at a felony trial the
choice to represent oneself cannot be
undertaken lightly. While the trial judge
did inform Defendant that he did not have
a right to counsel of his choice from PDA
and that he may be required to represent
himself, the trial judge failed to inform
Defendant
of
the
likely
perilous
repercussions of self-representation.
CONCLUSION
**41 We conclude that the trial court properly
denied Defendant's motion to dismiss under the
Speedy Trial Act. However, we hold that the trial
court erred in finding that the Defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
Accordingly, we reverse Defendant's conviction and
remand for a new trial.
**42 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH,
Associate Presiding Judge and WILLIAM A.
THORNE JR., Judge.
95 P.3d 1182, 503 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 2004 UT
App 224
END OF DOCUMENT

FN8. We note that this problem could have
been constitutionally solved early in the
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.

Addendum C

Addendum C

76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping.

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 8B
1999 REPLACEMENT

(1) A person commit^ aggravated kidnaping if the person intentionally or
knowingly, without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by any
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim:
(a) and in committing, attempting to commit, or in the immediate flight
after the attempt or commission of the kidnaping, the actor possesses,
uses, ot threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601; or
(b) with intent:
(i) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to
compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear
from engaging in particular conduct;
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight
after commission or attempted commission of a felony;
(iii) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another;
(iv) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or
political function; or
(v) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 4 of this chapter.
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result offorce, threat, or deceit
if the victim is mentally incompetent or younger than 16 years and the
detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the
victim's custodial parent, guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the
victim.
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 years and which
may be for life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section
76-3-406.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-302; 1974, ch. 32, § 12;
1983, ch. 88, § 15; 1995, ch. 337, § 4; 1995
(1st S.S.), ch. 10, § 5; 1996, ch. 40, § 6; 1998,
ch. 69, § 2.
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1

him for a second about that.

But I just don't trust anybody,

2

you know.

3

they say that we have these rights.

I think they're all out to get me because I

—

The United States of

4 America says we have rights, yet I've not been able to have
5

any of my rights here.
THE COURT:

6

I don't understand it.

All right.

I'll deny your motion to

7

dismiss.

The other thing that I pointed out before, too, I

8

really think your remedy is that if you think Ms. Neider is

9

guilty of some kind of misconduct you can contact the Bar

10

Association.

11

case.

12

I don't think the remedy is to dismiss the

Now let's go to the last motion, Mr. Pedockie, and that's

13

the motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.

14

I've had a chance to read through the memorandum and also the

15

state's response.

Anything you want to say about that?

MR. PEDOCKIE:

16

Again,

Yes.

I don't have the paperwork here

17

handy, but in her motion of objection she says that there was

18

a postponement from May
MR. GRAVIS:

19
20

—

She's not saying a postponement, but

that the time was running from May 25th to July 12th.
MR. PEDOCKIE:

21

And then from July 12th to August

22

1st —

from July 12th to August 1st she shows no time

23

running, yet I don't understand that due to the fact that

24

court wasn't even —

25

And, yes, there was a continuance on August 1st so how could

trial wasn't even set until August 13th.
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the clock stop until August 1st?

2
3

MR. GRAVIS:

They tried to set it earlier and Mr.

Boyle was not available to do the trial in July.

4

MR. PEDOCKIE:

And they tried to set another time

5

and the state wasnTt ready also.

6

agreement that August 13th was the date.

7

trying —

8

the state wasn't also ready, so they came to a mutual

9

agreement that August 13th would be the trial date.

So they came to a mutual
I guess he's

they're saying that my lawyer wasn't ready, but yet

I

10 believe it was August 13th, 14th, 15th, skipped, and then
11 went to the 17th.

I'm not sure.

Like I said, I don't have

12 my papers handy right now.
13
14

But in the preliminary hearing, pages 174 through 177,
you can clearly see that you guys all made agreements on

15 August 13th was the trial date.

Yet she has postponement on

16 me from July 12th to August 1st, which my time should have
17

been running at that time.

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

19

MR. PEDOCKIE:

Anything else on that?

Other than that, there was a

20 postponement on our behalf and then we were ready in
21

December.

She postponed it in December for grounds of good

22

cause, I believe.

23

November 20th and it wasn't postponed until December -- I

24

think December or -- I can't remember exactly, but it was

25

postponed again on good cause.

It says right here it was postponed from

And then it was set for

Page 32
1

another trial, January or February, and I wasn't present at

2

the time , which I believe was another Utah State right, or

3

United States of America right, or whatever you want to say,

4 my legal right to be present in court at any time.
5

would have denied another continuance.

6

then and I wasn't even there at that time.

7

they

THE COURT:

9

MR. PEDOCKIE:
there

And they postponed it
Which when

— it's clearly over my 120 days now.

8

10

I cl early

Okay.

Anything else?

I don't think so.

— I don't understand.

I know that

I believe, and I'd like to ask

11 my attorney, it is my right to be present at any court
12

hearings , isn't it?

13

MR. GRAVIS:

Generally, yeah.

14

MR. PEDOCKIE:

All right.

So I was just wondering

15

how —

I filed this and it's been over my 120 days, but

16

yet -- I don't understand how they could go over my 120 days

17

and me not be present in court and postpone it again.
THE COURT:

18
19

All right.

Anything else you want to

say?

20

MR. PEDOCKIE:

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. NEIDER:

No.

Does the state want to respond?
I think that, as outlined in the

23

memoranda, the dates are consistent with what the record[

24

reflects

25

request or to accommodate counsel's schedules.

They were either at Mr. Pedockie's counsel's
Specifically
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1

that date of July 12th, Mr. Boyle said he couldn!t try it.

2

The case law is clear that if it's to accommodate defense

3

counsel's schedule that that's part of the consideration,

4

that it does not —

5

the time does not run against the state.

In addition, that date in January that he's referring to

6 that he may not have been present for, at the time that we
7

continued the trial on November 28th Mr. Retallick indicated

8

that he had another case that may go in January and so we had

9

a backup date of February.

So Mr. Pedockie was present when

10

we talked about both of those dates.

11

reported to the court that he was unable to make that January

12

date so we used the backup date of February 4th.

13

that time -- he was present and was aware that that was a

14

possibility, that if Mr. Retallick's other case went he would

15

be moved to the February 4th date.

16

I think Mr. Retallick

That's why

Frankly I'm not sure it matters since on January 23rd he

17

fired Mr. Retallick and asked him to be taken off the case

18

and that he was going to hire Mr. Brass.

19

constitutional provisions his right to a speedy trial has not

I think under

20 been infringed upon or abridged and the state has complied
21

with the statutory provisions under the 120 detainer.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. PEDOCKIE:

All right.
Yes.

Anything else, Mr. Pedockie?

On this it was clear that she

24

said I was present on both things.

25

fact, I believe it even says in here that I was not present,

I was not present.

In
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1

but I was present on the other one.

2

of them, I know for a fact.

3

that.

4

I was not present on one

I would have clearly objected to

Also, it wasn't -- it was a mutual -- I don't understand

5

how they cannot proceed until August 1st due to the fact that

6

you guys sat here in the preliminary hearing, and we have it

7

in black and white on pages, like I said, 174 through 176,

8

that you yourself, Your Honor, said that this date will go.

9

That it should meet the 120 days.

And Mrs. Neider agreed

10

with it, so did Boyle.

11

1st it was postponed, which I understand that, which is in my

12

defense.

13

time was her's showing for good cause.

14

And then come to the fact on August

So all that time is dead time.

And then the next

But then when it was postponed again, due to the fact

15

that Retallick postponed it, I feel that I should have been

16

present at the time, because I clearly would have objected to

17

that.

18

time that -- I just feel that the time periods that she's

19

saying are not right.

20

hearing.

21

I'd be able to show you those also, Your Honor.

22

said that it should meet the 120 days as long as we get it in

23

before August 13th, or whatever it was, you know what I mean?

24

And then on August 1st was the delay.

25

before then?

At the time I wanted my 120 days, you know.

The only

It doesn't jive with the preliminary

In fact, if I had my preliminary hearing transcript
You yourself

So how could it be
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1

THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Pedockie, I want to take

2 a few minutes and walk through the history of the case so at
3 least we have a record as far as what I show on my —

as I

4 look through the record of this case.
5

I show that you were charged with this crime, aggravated

6 kidnapping, back on February 9th of 2001.

The case was

7 assigned originally to Judge Pam Heffernan.

You were then

8 arraigned on the 20th of February, 11 days later, here in
9 Weber County.

The public defender's office was appointed to

10 represent you.
11

Initially Mike Bouwhuis was assigned to represent you on

12 the case.

He conflicted out because of a conflict.

13 then assigned to Mike Boyle.

It was

Then the prelim was set

14 originally for March the 20th, which was a month after the
15 arraignment.

Mr. Boyle moved to have the case continued,

16 claiming that he wasn't prepared and ready to go.

So then

17 they scheduled it for a special setting for a prelim on the
18 13th of April.
19

One week before that, before the 13th of April, Judge

20 Heffernan recused herself, saying she couldn't handle the
21 case, and the case was then assigned to me.

Of course we

22 couldn't do the prelim on the 13th because the case had been
23 reassigned.
24

On the 10th of April you filed your disposition for

25 detainer.

The notice was received at the prison and here in
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1

the district court on the 18th of April.

On the 19th of

2

April we had a phone conference with you and your attorney at

3

that time, Mr. Boyle, to try and set this for a preliminary

4

hearing.

5

was held on that day.

6

bound over to stand trial.

We scheduled the prelim on—May—25rtb—of

2 00-1—

Pfc-

Mr. Boyle represented you and you were

7

At that time we tried to schedule a trial for you.

I

8

offered as the first setting on this case a trial date of

9

July 12th, 2001.

Mr. Boyle said he couldn't do it on that

10

date because of a conflict in his schedule.

11

agreed the first trial setting was to be August 13th, 2001.

12

Then, a couple of weeks before, we had a pretrial conference

13

on the 1st of August.

14

continuance on the case.

15

trial on the 13th of August date.

16

that date to argue some motions, and I think we did do that

17

on that date.

18

We ultimately

Mr. Boyle again asked for a
He said that he couldn't go to
Instead he wanted to use

We then scheduled your second trial.

That was for the

19

December date, the December 10th date.

20

November we had a pretrial conference, which was about two

21

weeks before trial.

22

case and Mr. Retallick replaced him at that time.

23

Then on the 29th of

At that time Mr. Boyle withdrew from the

I thought this was interesting, because at that point you

24

were insisting on going to trial on that December 10th date

25

even though you ! d now been assigned a new attorney.

Mr.
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1

Retallick said Ifll be ready to try the case.

2

he could have been ready, not when we assign him a case of a

3

first degree nature.

4

trial.

5

I don f t think

But he said Ifll be ready to go to

At that point the state asked for a continuance

6

indicating that Ms. Neider had another case, a murder case,

7

an older case, one that had been pending for trial for some

8

time, State versus Cochran.

9

case was ever filed.

It had been filed before your

I heard the arguments at that time.

10 And by the way, Mr. Cochran was also in custody as were you.
11 You objected to the continuance, or Mr. Retallick did for
12

you.

The court found good cause to grant the continuance.

13 We had two trials set essentially at the same time.

I found

14

that there was good cause because the Cochran case was a

15

little older and it was a murder case.

16

granted the continuance and found that there was good cause

17

existing to continue your trial.

18

So at that point I

I then offered you -- I believe you were there at that

19

time, that pretrial conference on the 29th of November.

20

were the one that was so emphatic with Mr. Retallick that we

21

go to trial on that December date.

22

MR. PEDOCKIE:

You

In fact I wanted to go to trial on

23 August 13th and Boyle said there was no way he could be
The state said they wouldn!t be ready due to the fact

24

ready.

25

that they had witnesses who had to come from out of state.

Page 38
1

So I just told -- it was my mistake to even postpone it

2 because it would have been -- but I was ready to go on August
3
4

13th also.
THE COURT:

All right.

So we had the trial date in

5 August then the one in December.

Then at that November

6 pretrial conference I offered your attorney a trial date of
7

January 14th.

8

that date.

9

2002, which now is the third time the case has been set.

10

Mr. Retallick said he wouldn't be available

We ultimately set a trial on February the 4th of

On January 23rdr at the pretrial conference a couple of

11

weeks before the trial, you appeared and you asked at that

12

point to fire Mr. Retallick.

13

represent you.

14

on that February 4th date.

15

we're ready to go, we want to proceed.

16

granted the continuance over the state's objection.

17

You said you wanted Ed Brass to

You said you couldn't be ready to go to trial
The state objected.

They said

They objected.

I

Then a week later, on the 30th of January, an attorney

18

named Scott Williams appeared in court for Mr. Brass

19

concerning that February 4th date.

20

to try this case on the 4th.

21

were ready to proceed, but I granted the continuance anyway.

22

We then scheduled a trial for April 15th.

23

fourth trial setting on the case.

24
25

He said we can't be ready

The state objected, saying they

This is now the

Three days before the trial was set Mr. Brass files a
motion on the 12th of April to withdraw from the case
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1 claiming there was a conflict.

The next day, on the 10th, we

2 have a phone conference between you, myself, and you were
3 down at the prison.

And we had Mr. Brass on the phone and

4 the prosecutor on the phone.

Mr. Brass asked to withdraw

5 from the case because of a conflict.
6 They wanted to proceed.

The state objected.

I granted the continuance at the

7 defense ' s request for a continuance.

So now Mr. Brass is out

8 of the case.
9

Then on May 1st, which is about three weeks later, you

10 appear in court.

I said to you back in April, I need to know

11 who your attorney is going to be.
12 to hire a lawyer.
13

You said I need some time

I said I'll give you three weeks.

So then you are in my courtroom on May 1st.

You ask

14 again, saying I need more time to hire an attorney.

You say

15 you're looking at an attorney out of Provo named Sheldon
16 Carter.

I give you two more weeks at that time.

17 the 21st of May.

We go to

You appear in court and still don't have an

18 attorney, but now this time you saw I may hire Paul Grant.

I

19 then reappoint the public defender's office as standby
20 [counsel to represent you and tell you you can hire Mr. Grant
21 if you want.

We then schedule this trial date.

Here we are

22 at the end of May and we're scheduling a trial date for the
23 30th of September
24

That is the fifth trial setting.

Then on July ;1st you file the motions that we've just

25 heard here today, these three motions, filed pro se.

So at
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1 least by my count we've had this case set five different
2 times.

We had the August 13th date of 2001, which was

3 continued by Mr. Boyle.

We had a December 10th, 2001 date,

4 continued at the request of the state.
5 2002, continued by the defendant.
6 continued by the defendant.

We had February 4th,

April 15th, 2002,

And now this fifth setting,

7 September 30th, 2002.
8

In addition to those five settings, I show that the court

9 has offered you two other trial dates, both of which were
10 rejected by your attorneys.
11 14th, 2002.

July 12th, 2001 and January

Your attorneys said at those times that they

12 couldn't be ready on those dates.
13

I show you've had at least two judges assigned to this

14 case.

Now the case has been assigned to me.

I show at least

15 six different attorneys involved in this case.
16 off with Mr. Bouwhuis, who recused himself.
17 who stepped down.

It started

Then Mike Boyle,

James Retallick, who you fired.

18 who asked to withdraw.

Ed Brass,

Paul Grant, who entered an appearance

19 but never appeared in court, and then filed a motion to
20 withdraw.

And maybe Sheldon Carter, who never has filed any

21 kind of a motion to appear.
22

So, based on the history of the case, and for the second

23 time, I'm going to deny the motion for dismissal for speedy
24 trial.
25

MR. PEDOCKIE:

On that, Your Honor, on August 1st
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1

the prosecutor is the one that said the date of December

2

10th.

3

wanted to go sooner and she said that there was no way.

4

only time that was available was December 10th.

5

understand why would she say this clear back in August due to

6

the fact that she didn't have no other time to do this, this

7

is the only time?

Yet back then we wanted to go sooner than that.

8
9

THE COURT:

We
The

I don!t

My recollection is that on August 1st,

when we set the December date, she was not here.

Another

10

attorney was here representing the state who had her

11

calendar.

12

realized that she couldnTt meet that date thatfs when we had

13

the other hearing.

14

We went ahead and set that and as soon as she

MR. PEDOCKIE:

No, she was here that day.

In fact,

15

she's the one that on August 1st said she needed the time to

16

get her witnesses out of other states.

17

that it was brought to her attention by her client that there

And she also said

18 might be threatening statements or whatever, I can't remember
19

exactly.

20

also on that date.

21

And that she might bring other charges against me

THE COURT:

But even if that's true, Mr. Pedockie,

22

you've now —

Mr. Boyle has withdrawn from the case in late

23

November.

24

Mr. Retallick could have been ready to try that case in ten

25

days and do any justice to the case itself.

We appointed Mr. Retallick.

There is no way that

The only reason
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1 he said that the defense was ready to proceed is because you
2

insisted on going to trial on that date.

In all honesty I

3

don't think he could have been prepared to represent you, at

4

least adequately.

He could have gone through the motions,

5 but to put an attorney on a case and expect him to be ready
6

to go on a first degree felony in ten days, I just think

7

that's too much.

8
9

But because you said to him I want to go to trial on that
date we made a record that you objected to the continuance.

10

I granted the continuance not because Mr. Retallick could or

11

could not be ready to go, but because the state had another

12

case that was older and involved a murder case.

13

MR. PEDOCKIE:

14

August 1st she's the one that —

15

and she says there's no openings until December 10th.

16

the one that was —
THE COURT:

17
18

setting.

19

pretrial hearing.

20

Which I don't understand, because on
we wanted to go before this
She's

that set that date.
No.

August 13th was your first trial

Your attorney asked to have it continued in a

MR. PEDOCKIE:

Yeah.

And we wanted to go before the

21

December date.

Then the prosecutor is the one that says the

22

only time I have is December 10th.

23

yet when the date comes —

24

time to go to trial —

25

think it would be and she says the only time I have is this

She set the date up, but

why would she set a date up, a

you even asked how many days do you
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1 time.

Why would she go about setting a trial date up when

2 she knows sh<e has another case at that time?
3

THE COURT:

All right.

I guess my feeling is we

4 argued this back in November, because you said your 120 days
5 would be up.

I found good cause to continue your case.

What

6 we had was a situation where two defendants were in custody.
7 Both were facing fairly serious charges.
8 you and a mu:trder case for Mr. Cochran.
9 can try both cases at the same time.
10 decision, wh.Lch case will I continue.

A first degree for

There is no way she
I had to make a
Of course, it f s pretty

11 obvious I had to continue yours because Mr. Cochranfs case
12 was older.
13

Et had been pending longer than yours had.

MR. PEDOCKIE:

And after that you're saying that I

14 was present <at all the dates, which I was not.
15

THE COURT:

Well, I don't recall ever setting any

16 kind of a trial date on any of your cases that you weren't
17 here for.
18

MR. PEDOCKIE:

Mr. Boyle —

not Mr. Boyle.

Mr.

19 Retallick postponed a thing by himself without me even being
20 here present

I was not present.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. PEDOCKIE:

Which date do you claim that took place?
I have it in all of my legal work

23 back at the Utah State Prison.

It was in January sometime.

24 I wasn T t present at that time.
25

MS. NEIDER:

That's the date that we had two dates
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1 where Mr. Pedockie was here.

Mr. Retallick was to report

2

back to the court.

3

do the January date but could do the February one.

4
5

MR. PEDOCKIE:

THE COURT:

You have the right to be here for

anything that is critical in terms of a trial proceeding.
MR. PEDOCKIE:

8
9

And I would have clearly objected.

Isn't it my right to be present at everything?

6
7

And he reported back and said he couldn't

I feel that that was critical due to

the fact that I would have objected.
THE COURT:

10

My recollection is that in November,

11

when we were resetting this case, we bumped the December

12

date.

13

You were here at that time.

I said to Mr. Retallick, there's two dates available.

14

MR. PEDOCKIE:

15

THE COURT:

16

February 4th.

17

you.

And I told you that --

I said I can give you January 14th or

Mr. Retallick said I'll have to get back to

He came back and said I can do February 4th.

18

MR. PEDOCKIE:

19

wanted to get it done.

20

set another trial date I would have objected.

21

should have been present when it was postponed again.

22
23

THE COURT:

And at that time I objected because I
That's why I said if he would have

You fired him.

I feel that I

We never got to the

February trial date because you fired him on the 23rd.

24

MR. PEDOCKIE:

25

without me being here.

But before then he postponed it
I know there was a date I was not
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1 here in court when there was a postponement.

And I clearly

2 would have objected because I objected all the way b ack in
3

December.

I would have objected to it in January, I would

4 have objected then too.
5

THE COURT:

6

MS. NEIDER:

7

THE COURT:

8

Anything else from the s tate?

No, Judge.
All right.

Anything else you want to

say?
MR. PEDOCKIE:

9
10

Okay.

I just want to go over the time frame

and see how many days were counted on there.

And in fact, I

11 never once waived my rights and it took them so many months
12

just to get me into a preliminary hearing.

13

state code it says when you1re incarcerated you have a 120

14

days to get in front of the preliminary hearing also
THE COURT:

15
16

trial five times now.

17

times •

Where in the Utah

Like I say, the case has been s et for
I show that you've continued it three

18

MR. PEDOCKIE:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. PEDOCKIE:

Before this even started

—

The fifth setting is still coming.
When I was sittin1 there -- when I

21

was arrested there were several times that my preliminary

22

heari ng wasn 1 t until about six or eight months after that.

23

That1 s way over 120 days, which is my legal right.

24
25

THE COURT:

Your prelim was May 25th.

You were

arrai gned on this charge on February the 20th, 2001.

The
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INDEX
JURY SELECTION

P. 21

OPENING STATEMENTS
MS. NEIDER

106

MR. PEDOCKIE

12 9

JEANETTE NICOLE SATHER
DIRECT EXAMINATION

135

CROSS-EXAMINATION

216

1)

OGDEN, UTAH

1) NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURES. I

SEPTEMBER 30, 2002

2) DONT KNOW HOW MANY CHALLENGES I HAVE. AND IT> ALSO LIKE TOv

2)

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. GOOD MORNING.

3)

MS. NEIDER: MORNING, JUDGE.

3) HAVE IT ON RECORD THAT I - 1 TRIED TO CONTACT MR. GRAVIS

4)

THE COURT: LET THE RECORD REFLECT THIS IS THE TIME SET

4) HERE TO HAVE MY WITNESSES SUBPOENAED SO I COULD HAVE

5) FOR TRIAL IN THE MATTER OF STATE OF UTAH VERSUS ROBERT

5) WITNESSES HERE. YET THIS IS EXACT WORDS AS I WAS TOLD THAT

6) PEDOCKTE. AND HERE ON BEHALF OF THE STATE, MS. NEIDER?

6) HE DOES NOT DO THAT. HIS SECRETARY MORE LESS TOLD ME HE

7)

MS. NEIDER: YES, JUDGE.

7) WASN'T DOING THAT. HE'S JUST HERE SO MORE LESS I DONT STICK

8)

THE COURT: AND LET'S SEE, WE HAVE MR. PEDOCKJE HERE

8) MY FOOT IN MY MOUTH 9)

9) REPRESENTING HIMSELF. AND WE ALSO HAVE MR. GRAVIS HERE AS

THE COURT: THATS RIGHT.

10) STANDBY COUNSEL. DID YOU GET A LIST OF JURORS?

10)

MR. PEDOCKJE: -BENEFIT YOU. BUT YET, THERE'S NO WAY

11)

MR. GRAVIS: WE HAVE A LIST OF JURORS.

11) THAT I'M CAPABLE OF GIVING ANY SUBPOENAS. I DONT EVEN KNOW

12)

THE COURT: LIST OF THOSE. STATE HAVE A LIST OF THE

12) HOW TO SUBPOENA -

13) JURORS?

13)

14)

MS. NEIDER: YES, JUDGE.

14) THIS, MR. PEDOCKJE. I THINK YOU'VE STARTING TO REALIZE THAT

15)

THE COURT: AND DID YOU ALSO GET A LIST OF THE 20

15) IT IS NOT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE TO REPRESENT YOURSELF. TRIALS
16) ARE WAY TOO COMPLICATED, ESPECIALLY CRIMINAL CASES, FOR A

16) QUESTIONS THAT I USUALLY ASK THE JURY?
17)
18)

THE COURT: WELL, SEE, AND THATS THE WHOLE PROBLEM WITH

MS. NEIDER: IDIDNT GET THAT, JUDGE.

17) DEFENDANT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF, BUT THATS TRUE, MR. GRAVIS

THE COURT: OKAY. HOW ABOUT YOU, MR. PEDOCKJE, DID YOU

18) DOESN'T REPRESENT YOU. HE'S STANDBY COUNSEL. HE'S APPOINTED

19) GET A LIST OF THOSE QUESTIONS?

19) HERE BY THE COURT TO ASSIST YOU IN LEGAL ISSUES, BUT HE

20)

MR. PEDOCKJE: NO, I DID NOT.

20) DOESNT REPRESENT YOU IN THE SENSE THAT HE'LL SERVE SUBPOENAS

21)

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING WE NEED TO TAKE UP

21) OR DO ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE. HE'S JUST GONNA GIVE YOU

22) BEFORE WE BRING IN THE JURY? LETS HAVE THE RECORD REFLECT

22) LEGAL ADVICE. HE'LL HELP YOU WITH THE JURY SELECTION

23) THE JURY PANEL IS NOT PRESENT. MR. PEDOCKJE, ANYTHING WE

23) PROCESS.

24) NEED TO TAKE UP?

24)

25)

25) AND MY - ALL THE DISCOVERY, EVERYTHING, YET THE PROSECUTOR

MR. PEDOCKJE: YES, YOUR HONOR. I'M NOT EDUCATED OR I'M

MR. PEDOCKJE: SEE YOU - EARLIER I ASKED FOR EVIDENCE

Page 6
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1) HAS NOT GIVEN ME ANY DISCOVERY, ANY EVIDENCE, ANYTHING

1) ENTITLED TO GO FORWARD ALSO. BUT IT DOESNT DO ME ANY GOOD

2) WHATSOEVER WHICH IS - HOW CAN I BUILD A CASE OR DEFEND

2) TO APPOINT AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT YOU BECAUSE YOU JUST FIRE

3) MYSELF WITHOUT ANY OF THIS ALSO. AND THEN NOT - LIKE I SAID

3) THEM BECAUSE YOU DONT LIKE THE ADVICE THEY'RE GIVING YOU,

4) ON TOP OF THAT, YOU'RE TELLING ME I HAD TO GO THROUGH

4) S O -

5) MR. GRAVIS -

5)

6)

THE COURT: NO -

6) THE OTHER ONE HAD A CONFLICT BECAUSE THEY WERE REPRESENTING

7)

MR. PEDOCKJE: ~ GRAVIS'SECRETARY-

7) THE STATE'S CLIENT, SO -

8)

THE COURT: - YOU DONT HAVE TO GO THROUGH MISTER -

8)

9) MR. GRAVIS IS STANDBY COUNSEL. HE DOES NOT REPRESENT YOU.

MR PEDOCKJE: I'VE ONLY FIRED ONE ATTORNEY, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: WELL, AND THATS WHAT I SAY, THE ATTORNEY

9) YOU FIRED WAS -

10) AS I SAID BEFORE, HE'S APPOINTED BY THE COURT TO ASSIST YOU

10)

11) ON LEGAL ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, YOU SAY YOU DONT KNOW HOW

11) BOYLE DUE TO THE FACT HE HAS CLASS ACTIONS LAWSUITS -

12) MANY JURORS YOU'RE GONNA SEAT. THERE'S GONNA BE NINE JURORS

12)

13) ON THIS CASE. YOU'LL HAVE A CHANCE TO DO A PEREMPTORY

13) OFFICE-

14) CHALLENGE FOR FOUR, PLUS ONE ALTERNATE, SO YOU CAN STRIKE UP

14)

15) TO FIVE PEREMPTORILY, OKAY?

15) RETALLICK. OTHER THAN THAT-

16)

MR.PEDOCKIE: I HAVE NO CLUE WHAT YOU JUST SAID.

16)

THE COURT: RIGHT.

17)

MR. PEDOCKJE: - AND THE NEXT ONE THE COURTS FIRED MIKE

THE COURT: NO. MR BOYLE LEFT THE PUBLIC DEFENDERS'

MR. PEDOCKJE: WHATEVER THAT HAPPENED, THEN JAMES

THE COURT: I KNOW YOU DONT BECAUSE THATS - YOU DONT

17)

MR. PEDOCKJE: ~1HAVENT DID NOTHING.

18) KNOW WHAT YOU'RE DOING. BUT WE'VE ALREADY BEEN THROUGH THIS

18)

THE COURT: BUT YOU DIDNT JUST FIRE MR. RETALLICK. YOU

19) A MILLION TIMES. I TOLD YOU ITS NOT TO YOUR ADVANTAGE TO

19) FIRED THE ENTIRE PUBLIC DEFENDERS' OFFICE. YOU SAID, I DONT

20) REPRESENT YOURSELF, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, I THINK THIS IS

20) WANNA BE REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC DEFENDERS. SO THAT LEFT

21) EXACTLY WHAT YOU WANT. EVERY TIME I APPOINT AN ATTORNEY,

21) YOU WITH THE OPTION OF EITHER REPRESENTING YOURSELF OR HIRING

22) EVERY TIME YOU HIRE A LAWYER, THE ATTORNEY IS EITHER FIRED BY

22) A PRIVATE ATTORNEY. YOU HIRED ED BRASS. WE GOT READY TO TRY

23) YOU OR ASKED TO STEP DOWN FROM THE CASE. AND I CANT HAVE

23) THE CASE. MR. BRASS CALLED AND SAID, JUDGE, I WANNA WITHDRAW

24) THIS GO ON ANY LONGER. WE'VE HAD FIVE TRIAL SETTINGS NOW.

24) FROM THE CASE. I CANT REPRESENT MR PEDOCKJE. I THEN TOLD

25) THIS CASE IS A YEAR AND NINE MONTHS OLD. THE STATE IS

25) YOU, YOU CAN HIRE ANYBODY YOTIWA-NTT T aAVF vni T AMOTTTPT?

1) CONTINUANCE, BUT I TOLD YOU WE'RE GONNA GO TO TRIAL ON THIS

1) ATTORNEY, YOU END UP FIRING THE ATTORNEY OR THE ATTORNEY

2) CASE ON SEPTEMBER 30TH. YOU'VE NEVER HIRED ANYONE.

2) WITHDRAWS, AND THIS CANT GO ON FOREVER.

3)

3)

MR. PEDOCKIE: YOUR HONOR, I DID NOT SAY THAT I DIDN'T

MR. PEDOCKIE: THE ONLY ONE THAT I'VE - I'M NOT GONNA

4) WANT ANYBODY FROM THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION. IN FACT,

4) SIT HERE AND ARGUE. I DON'T WANNA SIT HERE AND ARGUE. WE'VE

5) I ASKED FOR ONE AFTER ED BRASS - OR ACTUALLY, I THINK IT WAS

5) BEEN OVER IT A HUNDRED TIMES. IF YOU'RE DENYING ME ACCESS TO

6) PAUL GRANT.

6) COUNSEL, I'D LUCE TO HAVE THAT ON RECORD -

7)

THE COURT: WELL, THERE'S ANOTHER ONE, PAUL GRANT -

7)

THE COURT: ITS ON RECORD -

8)

MR. PEDOCKIE: AND I DID NOT FIRE HIM ALSO.

8)

MR. PEDOCKIE: - THAT YOU'RE DENYING ME ACCESS TO

9)

THE COURT: WELL, HE FILED A NOTICE WITHDRAWING FROM THE

9) COUNSEL.

10) CASE, S O -

10)

THE COURT: - AND YOU'VE GOT THE BENEFIT OF THE RECORD.

11)

MR. PEDOCKIE: YEAH.

11) NOW, MR. PEDOCKIE, I ALSO SUGGEST TO YOU THAT YOU NOT MENTION

12)

THE COURT: WELL, I'M GONNA FIND, SIR, THAT YOU'VE

12) THIS TO THE JURY. THE JURY CANT HELP YOU ON THIS QUESTION.

13) KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED YOUR RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY

13) THIS IS A LEGAL MATTER. AND SO MY SUGGESTION TO YOU IS THAT

14) IN THIS MATTER -

14) YOU NOT BRING IT UP IN FRONT OF THE JURY. ITS NOT GONNA

15)

MR. PEDOCKIE: AND I WANT IT ON RECORD THAT I HAVE NOT

15) HELP YOUR CASE AT ALL TO MENTION THIS TO THE JURY. THIS IS A

16)

THE COURT: OKAY. THATS FINE, YOU'VE GOT THE BENEFIT

16) LEGAL ISSUE. YOU'VE HAD IT - PUT IT ON THE RECORD TIME AND

17) OF THE RECORD-

17) TIME AGAIN THAT YOU WANT AN ATTORNEY. ITS THERE, ITS ON

18)

MR. PEDOCKIE: I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE LAW NOR-

18) THE RECORD, BUT I WOULDN'T MENTION IT TO THE JURY.

19)

THE COURT: YOU DONT, SIR -

19)

20)

MR. PEDOCKIE: - DO I - YOU KNOW WHAT I MEAN, AND -

20) THAT I'M -

21)

MR. PEDOCKIE: I FEEL THAT ITS THE JURY'S RIGHT TO KNOW

THE COURT: - AND MY SUGGESTION IS THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE

21)

THE COURT: OKAY.

22) HAD AN ATTORNEY, BUT YOU JUST KEEP PLAYING GAMES WITH US -

22)

MR. PEDOCKIE: - BEING - I'M REPRESENTING MYSELF NOT

23)

23) IN MY OWN BEHALF -

MR. PEDOCKIE: AND THATS WHY I SAID, TVE ASKED FOR AN

24) ATTORNEY. IVOKE MY SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT SEVERAL TIMES.

24)

25)

25) YOU TO UNDERSTAND IF THATS WHAT YOU WANNA DO, THE JURY'S

THE COURT: THATS RIGHT, AND EVERY TIME WE GIVE YOU AN

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND THATS FINE, SIR. I WANT
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1) ALSO GONNA FIND OUT HOW MANY TIMES THIS CASE HAS BEEN SET FOR

1) COURTROOM. OKAY?

2) TRIAL-

2)

ALSO, ON VOIR DIRE, ON JURY SELECTION, IF YOU HAVE ANY

3)

MR. PEDOCKIE: THATS FINE.

3) QUESTIONS THAT YOU WANT POSED TO THE JURY, I NEED THOSE IN

4)

THE COURT: - AND WHATS HAPPENED EVERY TIME WE'VE SET

4) WRITING. I'M NOT GONNA LET THE ATTORNEYS OR YOU ASK

5) IT FOR TRIAL, AND THE MESSAGE THATS GONNA COME ACROSS TO

5) QUESTIONS OF THE JURY PANEL.

6) THIS JURY, SIR, IS THAT YOU'RE PLAYING GAMES WITH THE SYSTEM,

6)

7) S O -

7) MYSELF, I FEEL THAT I SHOULD HAVE THAT ADEQUATE ACCESS TO THE

8)

8) SAME THING AS MRS. NEIDER HERE -

9)
10)

MR. PEDOCKIE: THATS THE COURT: - 1 JUST WANNA BE ABLE TO WARN YOU MR. PEDOCKIE: I HAVE NO CONFLICT OF LETTING THEM SEE

9)
10)

MR. PEDOCKIE: WELL, IF YOU'RE GONNA MAKE ME REPRESENT

THE COURT. WHICH IS WHAT?
MR. PEDOCKIE: - AND I DO HAVE A RIGHT TO ASK

11) THAT BECAUSE, LIKE I SAID, ITS IN BLACK AND WHITE THAT I'VE

11) QUESTIONS.

12) NOT FIRED ALL - ANY - ANY OF 'EM.

12)

13)

THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. NOW -

13) IF YOU WANNA WRITE QUESTIONS DOWN AND GIVE 'EM TO ME, I'LL

14)

MR. PEDOCKIE: BESIDES MAYBE RETALLICK.

14) DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT THEY'RE APPROPRIATE QUESTIONS AND I'LL

15)

THE COURT: OKAY.

15) PUT THE QUESTION TO THE JURY PANEL. I DONT HAVE ANY TROUBLE

16)

MR. PEDOCKIE: AND THATS WHEN I HIRED ED BRASS.

16) WITH THAT AS LONG AS ITS AN APPROPRIATE QUESTION. BUT I'M

17)

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE OTHER THING IS, SIR, IF YOU

17) NOT GONNA LET EITHER SIDE ASK THE JURY ANY QUESTIONS. SO IF

THE COURT: NO, YOU DONT HAVE A RIGHT TO ASK QUESTIONS.

18) HAVE ANY EXHIBITS THAT YOU WANT A WITNESS TO LOOK AT DURING

18) YOU'VE GOT QUESTIONS -

19) THIS - THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL, YD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU'D

19)

20) HAND THE EXHIBIT TO THE BAILIFF AND THE BAILIFF WILL GIVE

20) JURIES.

21) THAT TO THE WITNESS. I DONT WANT YOU APPROACHING ANY OF THE

21)

22) WITNESSES OKAY? I DONT WANT YOU WANDERING AROUND THE

22) NOT GONNA HAVE EITHER MS. NEIDER OR YOURSELF ASKING THE JURY

23) COURTROOM. OKAY? JUST STAY WHERE YOU ARE AT THE TABLE.

23) ANY QUESTIONS. IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY PANEL

24) WE'VE GOT A RECORDER HERE, A COURT REPORTER. ITS BEING

24)

MR. PEDOCKIE. OH, I MEAN - 1 THOUGHT TO PICK THE

THE COURT. THATS RIGHT. DURING JURY SELECTION, I'M

MR. PEDOCKIE: SO WHAT DO I DO, SIT UP HERE -

1)

1) TO PREPARE FOR THIS CASE, AND YOU HAVE DONE ABSOLUTELY

MR.PEDOCKIE: - AND MAKE A SCANDAL AND MOCKERSY OF

2) THIS WHOLE CASE, THEN THATS -

2) NOTHING EXCEPT EITHER FIRE YOUR LAWYER OR THE ATTORNEY HAS

3)

3) ASKED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE CASE. EVERY TIME I GIVE YOU A

THE COURT: SIR, THERE'S NOTHING IN THE - THERE'S

4) NOTHING IN THE LAW THAT SAYS YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO QUESTION THE

4) TRIAL DATE, YOU'RE NOT READY TO PROCEED. YOU'VE NEVER BEEN

5) JURY PANEL. AND THATS WHY I SAID TO YOU, IF YOU REMEMBER,

5) READY.

6) THREE WEEKS AGO, SIR, IF YOU'VE GOT ANY JURY INSTRUCTIONS, I

6)

7) WANT THOSE IN WRITING. I WANT *EM AT THE PRETRIAL. IF YOU

7)

THE COURT: YOU'VE NEVER BEEN READY TO TRY THIS CASE -

8) HAVE ANY QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY ON JURY SELECTION, I WANT

8)

MR. PEDOCKIE: SO ITS NOT ON RECORD THEN ONE TIME WHEN

9) MICHAEL BOYLE WAS HERE I TOLD HIM LETS GO HE SAYS THAT HE

9) THOSE IN WRITING. YOU DIDNT GIVE ME EITHER ONE.
10)

MR. PEDOCKIE: OH, I'VE NEVER BEEN READY?

10) WAS NOT READY. I SAYS -

MR.PEDOCKIE: I DID - 1 DID HAVE A MOTION FILED MORE

11) LESS COUNTERDICT OF WHAT MRS. NEIDER WAS SAYING IN HER JURY

11)

THE COURT: THATS RIGHT.

12) SELECTION OR WHATEVER. LIKE I SAID, I HAVE NO CLUE OF WHAT

12)

MR. PEDOCKIE: ~ LETS GO ON AUGUST - 1 WAS HERE ON -

13) I'M DOING, SO -

13) I BELIEVE IT WAS AUGUST 1 ST OR APRIL 1ST, I'M NOT SURE

14)

THE COURT: THATS RIGHT.

14) BECAUSE I DO NOT HAVE NO RECORD OR TRANSCRIPTS, WHICH I'VE

15)

MR.PEDOCKIE: ~ I DON'T KNOW MEAN TO OFFEND ANYBODY -

15) ASKED SEVERAL TIMES TO HAVE. AND I TOLD MR. BOYLE LETS GO

16)

THE COURT: THATS RIGHT, YOU DONT HAVE A -

16) AND THEN THE STATE SAYS, WELL, WE'RE NOT READY BECAUSE WE

17)

MR.PEDOCKIE: - WHATSOEVER, BUT LIKE I SAYS, I DON'T

17) HAVE WITNESSES, DA-DA-DA-DA-DA, AND ALL THIS, AND THEN I

18) SEE HOW WE COULD PROGRESS OR PROCEED ANY FURTHER WITHOUT ME

18) SAYS, HEY LOOK, IF YOU'RE NOT READY, LETS POSTPONE IT.

19) KNOWING ANYTHING ABOUT THE LAW AND EDUCATED ENOUGH -

19) THATS NOT - YOU KNOW WHAT I MEAN? SO THATS NOT MY FAULT.

20)

20) THEN ON DECEMBER 10TH I'M READY TO GO AGAIN, YET MRS. NEIDER

THE COURT: BUT YOU SEE, MR. PEDOCKIE, YOU'RE TRYING TO

21) HOLD THE SYSTEM CAPTIVE, OKAY? YOU'RE TRYING TO HOLD US ALL

21) WASNT PREPARED DUE TO THE FACT, YOU KNOW, I BELIEVE IT WAS

22) CAPTIVE BY DRAGGING YOUR FEET. YOU DONT WANT THIS CASE TO

22) AUGUST, SHE'S THE ONE THAT SAID THE RECORD AND SCHEDULED FOR

23) GO TO TRIAL ~

23) DECEMBER 10TH BECAUSE THERE WAS NO OPENINGS AVAILABLE TRIAL

24)

MR. PEDOCKIE: OH, YES, I DO.

24) SOONER, BUT YET WHEN THE TIME COMES, SHE HAD A CONFLICT

25)

THE COURT: NO, YOU DONT. YOU'VE HAD A YEAR AND A HALF

25) BECAUSE SHE HAD ANOTHER CASE TO TRIAL. WELL, HOW - YOU
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1) KNOW, I GUESS SHE DIDN'T HAVE THIS, SO WHAT, IT JUST

1) VIOLATING MY SDCTH AMENDMENT RIGHT, LETS HAVE HIM SIT HERE

2) MAGICALLY APPEARED? OR WHY WOULD YOU DOUBLE BOOK AN

2) BECAUSE I - 1 WOULD HATE TO MAKE YOU GUYS FEEL GUILTY OF

3) INCIDENT, YOU KNOW WHAT I MEAN? AND THEN YOU FOUND GOOD

3) VIOLATING MY SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT.

4) CAUSE TO POSTPONE IT AGAIN. AND THEN, YES, I POSTPONED THE

4)

THE COURT: WELL, HE'S THERE TO HELP YOU ON LEGAL

5) ONE WITH RETALLICK BECAUSE HE WASN'T DOING ANYTHING, YOU

5) ISSUES. HE'S NOT A GOPHER FOR YOU, MR. PEDOCKIE -

6) KNOW.

6)

7)

7) GONNA ARGUE ANY MOTION -

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING ELSE YOU

8) WANNA PUT ON THE RECORD? WE GOT A JURY WAITING.
9)

MR. PEDOCKIE: YEAH, I DONT FEEL THAT THIS SHOULD

MR. PEDOCKIE: AND HE'S ALREADY TOLD ME THAT HE'S NOT

8)

THE COURT: HE'S NOT - HE'S NOT ARGUING -

9)

MR. PEDOCKIE. - HE'S NOT GONNA DO ANYTHING, SO -

10) PROCEED ANY FURTHER. I THINK THIS IS A MOCKRACY. SCAM AND A

10)

THE COURT: - FOR YOU. HE'S SIMPLY THERE TO GIVE

11) MOCKRACY -

11) YOU-

12)

THE COURT: OKAY.

12)

13)

MR. PEDOCKIE: - AND THAT I'M UNABLE OF REPRESENTING

MR. PEDOCKIE: - SO THATS JUST TAKING UP THE

13) TAXPAYERS'DOLLARS.

14) MYSELF AND I'M VOKING MY SLXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT.

14)

15)

THE COURT: OKAY.

15) DONT WE JUST EXCUSE MR. GRAVIS THEN AND WE'LL LET HIM GO DO

THE COURT. OKAY. WELL, IF THATS THE WAY YOU FEEL, WHY

16)

MR. PEDOCKIE: AND AS FAR AS HIM BEING NEXT TO ME, I

16) SOMETHING THATS IMPORTANT -

17) THINK THAT WE SHOULD JUST EXCUSE HIM BECAUSE, LIKE I SAID, MY

17)

18) CA - CASE WORKER AND I BOTH SAT THERE AND WE WERE TOLD THAT

18)

THE COURT: - OKAY? IS THAT HOW YOU FEEL?

19) HE DOESN'T DO NOTHING. HE'S NOT GONNA DO NOTHING. I WAS

19)

MR. PEDOCKIE: THATS HOW I FEEL.

20) TOLD BY HIM HIMSELF THAT HE WASN'T GONNA ARGUE ANYTHING, HE

20)

THE COURT: OKAY. ANYTHING YOU WANT TO SAY, MR. GRAVIS?

21) WASN'T GONNA DO ANYTHING. SO WHY NOT JUST - IF IT MAKES YOU

21) I'M SURE YOU'VE GOT MORE IMPORTANT THINGS TO DO THAN SIT AND

22) FEEL BETTER - OR THE COURTS TO FEEL BETTER, I SHOULD SAY,

22) BE INSULTED BY MR PEDOCKIE ALL DAY.

23) ABOUT VIOLING MY SDCTH - VIOLATING MY SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT

23)

24) TO HAVE HIM SIT HERE, LETS HAVE HIM SIT HERE, IF THATS WHAT

24) PROBABLY RESPOND TO HIS REQUEST FOR -

25) YOU - MAKES YOU GUYS FEEL BETTER AROI IT VTOT TMn mrv _

MR. PEDOCKIE: YEAH.

MS. NEIDER: JUDGE, I THINK THAT IF MR. GRAVIS COULD

1)

MS. NEIDER: - COOPERATION LAST WEEK. I THINK THAT

1) YOUR HONOR, THE REASON WHY I DID NOT WANNA PROCEED WITH HIS

2) IT'S IMPORTANT -

2) QUESTIONS FOR THE JURORS IS BECAUSE I SAT IN THE ROOM RIGHT

3)

3) THERE RIGHT NEXT TO HIM. I ASKED HTM HOW HE FEELS ABOUT MY

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LETS PUT THAT ON THE RECORD

4) THEN.

4) CASE, AND HE SAYS, TO BE HONEST, I HAVE NOT READ MY - 1 HAVE

5)

5) NOT READ YOUR CASE. WELL, HOW COULD I FEEL CONFIDENT OF AN

MS. NEIDER: - THAT THE RECORD REFLECT THAT HE WAS NOT

6) UNCOOPERATIVE.

6) INDIVIDUAL THATS PUT FORTH ANY EFFORT THAT HASN'T READ MY

7)

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

7) CASE?

8)

MR. GRAVIS: ALL I KNOW IS THAT MELISSA TOLD ME THAT HE

8)

THE COURT: BECAUSE HE'S NOT REPRESENTING YOU, S I R -

9) CALLED ON THURSDAY AND HE WAS RUDE TO THE RECEPTIONIST. THE

9)

MR. PEDOCKIE: I KNOW, BUT HE'S -

10) RECEPTIONIST IS NOT EVEN IN THE SAME OFFICE BUIL DING THAT I'M

10)

THE COURT: - HE'S COME TODAY TO ADVISE YOU -

11) IN. AND SHE HUNG UP ON HIM. AND THEN HE CALLED FRIDAY ABOUT

11)

MR. PEDOCKIE: I KNOW, BUT HOW WOULD HE KNOW WHAT

12) 2:15 WANTING SUBPOENAS. I WASN'T THERE, SO I DON'T - BUT

12) QUESTIONS TO PRESENT TO JURORS?

13) SHE JUST TOLD HIM IT WAS TOO LATE. THAT WAS NO WAY WE COULD

13)

14) GET SUBPOENAS OUT AND GET TiM SERVED.

14) THE JURORS. YOU'RE REPRESENTING YOURSELF. HEISSIMPLV WHAT

15)

15) WE CALL STANDBY COUNSEL HE'S THERE TO GIVE YOU ADVICE ON

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO THIS CALL CAME FRIDAY YOU SAY

THE COURT: HE DOESNT - HE'S NOT QUESTIONING ANY OF

16) ABOUT 2:15?

16) LEGAL ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, HOW TO SELECT A JURY, WHO TO TAKE

17)

MR. GRAVIS: THAT'S WHAT MELISSA TOLD ME.

17) OFF ON THE JURY. THATS WHAT HE'S THERE FOR.

18)

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND DID YOU HAVE ADDRESSES FROM

18)

MR. PEDOCKIE: AND ON THE 18TH, YOU TOLD ME THAT I HAD

19) HIM AS FAR AS WHERE TO SEND THESE SUBPOENAS?

19) TO GO THROUGH MR. GRAVIS TO GET ALL THESE TRANSCRIPTS, BUT

20)

20) YET, NOW, WHEN I TRY TO GO THROUGH HIM, THEY'RE TRYING TO

MR. GRAVIS: NO. I DON'T KNOW IF HE HAD ADDRESSES ON

21) FRIDAY, BUT HE - IN OTHER DATES I'VE ASKED HIM FOR ADDRESSES

21) TELL ME - AND ITS NOT JUST BEEN THE THURSDAY AND FRIDAY

22) OR PHONE NUMBERS, AND THE ONLY NAMES I'VE GOTTEN IS PEOPLE

22) I'VE CALLED HIM. AND IN FACT, MY CASEWORKER HAS A WRITTEN

23) THE STATE'S ALREADY SUBPOENAED.

23) STATEMENT AND WOULD BE MORE THAN WILLING TO COME AND TESTIFY

24)

THE COURT: OKAY.

24) IN MY BEHALF THAT I HAVE CALLED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, AND WE

25)

MR.PEDOCKJJE: I HAVE SEVERAL OTHER WITNESS, AND ALSO,

25) DO HAVE PHONE RECORDS. WE HAVE HIM. HE'S A CORRECTIONAL
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1) OFFICER AND A CASEWORKER. WE'LL HAVE - WE COULD HAVE HIM

1) RAILROADING ME. I THINK THAT WEBER STATE'S RAILROADING ME

2) SUBPOENAED. BUT THEN AGAIN, I DO NOT KNOW HOW TO SUBPOENA

2) AND VIOLATING MY RIGHTS. AND HOW IN THE HECK DO YOU EXPECT

3) ANYBODY, SO HOW WOULD WE BE ABLE TO GO ABOUT THIS, YOU KNOW?

3) SOMEBODY WITH NO EDUCATION IN THE LAW - LIKE I TOLD YOU, I'M

4) LIKE I SAID, I JUST - 1 DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW WE'RE GONNA

4) NOT EDUCATED NOR FAMILIAR WITH THE RULES AND PROCEEDINGS

5) PROCEED ANY FURTHER WITHOUT ANY WITNESSES IN MY BEHALF AND -

5) AND I D O N T EVEN KNOW HOW MANY CHALLENGES I CAN GET. AND I

6)

THE COURT: THAT'S TRUE. THAT'S YOUR PROBLEM, SIR -

6) DONT KNOW HOW TO EVEN CROSS-EXAMINE A WITNESS -

7)

MR.PEDOCKIE: I MEAN ITS - ITS JUST.

7)

THE COURT: THATS RIGHT.

8)

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING ELSE YOU WANNA PUT ON

8)

MR. PEDOCKIE: - LET ALONE ANYTHING ELSE. AND YOU'RE

9) THE RECORD, MR. GRAVIS?

9) EXPECTING ME TO GET A FAIR TRIAL? LIKE I SAID, I'M NOT

10)

MR. GRAVIS: NO, YOUR HONOR.

10) TRYING TO BE OFFENSIVE TO ANYBODY, BUT I JUST THINK - THINK

11)

THE COURT: STATE HAVE ANY -

11) THAT ITS - YOU KNOW WHAT I MEAN -

12)

MS. NEIDER: JUDGE, I THINK - 1 THINK JUST A LITTLE

12)

THE COURT. BUT YOU SEE, YOU CREATED THIS SITUATION

13) MORE COLLOQUY WITH MR. PEDOCKIE ABOUT THE DANGERS AND

13) MR. P E D O C K I E -

14) DISADVANTAGES OF PROCEEDING WITHOUT MR. GRAVIS TO HELP HIM AT

14)

15) A L L -

15) H O N O R -

16)

THE COURT: OKAY.

16)

17)

MS. NEIDER: - I THINK WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

17) FAR MORE INTELLIGENT THAN YOU WANT ME TO BELIEVE. EVERY TIME

18)

THE COURT: YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? HE IS TRAINED IN THE

18) WE GOT READY TO TRY THIS CASE, THE LAST FOUR TIMES, YOU'VE

MR. PEDOCKIE: THATS WHAT YOU KEEP TELLING ME, YOUR

THE COURT: AND THERE'S NO DOUBT IN MY MIND, SIR, YOU'RE

19) LAW. HE CAN HELP YOU ON THE LAW, THE LEGAL ISSUES HERE,

19) FIRED YOUR ATTORNEY JUST BEFORE TRIAL. AND THATS A

20) ABOUT THE VOIR DIRE, ABOUT THE JURY SELECTION, ABOUT THE JURY

20) DELIBERATE ACT ON YOUR PART TO TRY TO STALL OUT THIS TRIAL

21) INSTRUCTIONS, ABOUT CROSS-EXAMINATION, THERE'S A NUMBER OF

21) PROCEEDING.

22) ISSUES THAT HE COULD HELP YOU WITH ON THIS CASE. HE DOESN'T

22)

23) REPRESENT YOU, BUT HE CERTAINLY CAN GIVE YOU ADVICE.

23) RECORDS, YOUR HONOR, I WAS READY ON AUGUST 1ST -

24)

24)

THE COURT: YEAH.

25^

MR P F D O r i n F - - ANn THFM ROVT V WA W T

MR. PEDOCKIE: RIGHT NOW, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T BELIEVE

25} ANYTHING COULD HELP ME BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT YOU GUYS ARE

MR PEDOCKIE: AND LIKE I SAID, IF WE GO AND PULL UP THE

T WAS RFADY ON

1) DECEMBER 10TH CAMILLE NEIDER WASN'T I'D-I'D LIKE TO

1) WANNA PUT ON THE RECORD, MR GRAVIS''

2) HAVE THIS GO TO TRIAL AS MUCH AS YOU GUYS WOULD DO YOU

2)

MR GRAVIS NO, YOUR HONOR

3) THINK THAT I - MY MOTHER JUST HAD BRAIN SURGERY, IS IN THE

3)

THE COURT ANYTHING ELSE FROM THE STATE?

4) U OFU AND DO YOU THINK THAT ID MUCH RATHER SIT HERE WITH

4)

MS NEIDER NO, JUDGE

5) YOU GUYS THAN BE ABLE TO GO OUT THERE? I'D RATHER HAVE THIS

5)

THE COURT ALL RIGHT I'M GONNA RELEASE MR GRAVIS

6) OVER WITH AND DONE WITH AND BE ABLE TO MOVE ON WITH MY LIFE

6) THEN

7) THAN SIT HERE AND ARGUE WITH YOU GUYS ABOUT THIS SITUATION,

7)

MR GRAVIS THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

8) YOU KNOW LIKE I SAID, MY - MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAVE

8)

MR PEDOCKIE AND I'D LIKE TO HAVE IT ON RECORD THAT I

9) DIDN'T VOLUNTARILY, BUT I'D LIKE TO HAVE COUNSEL HERE, BUT

9) BEEN VIOLATED, NOT JUST ONCE, BUT MANY TIMES AND I'M 10) LIKE I SAID, I'M VOKING MY RIGHT FOR COUNSEL AT THIS TIME

10) SOMEBODY THAT HAS MY BEST INTERESTS -

11) ALSO

11)

THE COURT OKAY

12)

12)

MR PEDOCKIE - AT STAKE INSTEAD OF SOMEBODY THAT'S

THE COURT ALL RIGHT WELL, I THINK WE'VE PUT THAT ON

13) THE RECORD AND I'VE TOLD YOU THERE'S SOME REAL DISADVANTAGES

13) NOT GONNA ARGUE ANYTHING OR SAY ANYTHING IN MY BEHALF

14) TO REPRESENTING YOURSELF THERE'S SOME REAL DISADVANTAGES TO

14)

15) NOT LISTENING TO MR GRAVIS IN THIS CASE, BUT APPARENTLY THIS

15) PARTIES, YOU CAN MOVE ON THIS SIDE BECAUSE THE JURY'S GONNA

16) IS WHAT YOU WANNA DO YOU DIDNT WANT MR GRAVIS -

16) BE OUT HERE IN THE AUDIENCE, SO IF YOU WANNA MOVE MR

17)

17) PEDOCKIE AROUND ON THIS SIDE

MR PEDOCKJE NO, THIS IS NOT WHAT I WANNA DO I'D

18)

18) LIKE TO HAVE ATTORNEY IT) LIKE TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY 19)

THE COURT WHAT, SO YOU CAN FIRE HIM AGAIN?

19)

20)

MR PEDOCKIE - TO HAVE MY BEST WISHES AND MY

20)

THE COURT NOW, LETS HAVE THE ATTORNEYS ~ OR THE

ALL RIGHT LETS BRING IN THE JURY THEN
(THE JURY ENTERS THE COURTROOM )
THE COURT ALL RIGHT LETS HAVE THE RECORD REFLECT

21) INTERESTS -

21) THIS IS THE MATTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH VERSUS ROBERT

22)

22) PEDOCKIE ITS CASE 0689 STATE IS PRESENT AND REPRESENTED

THE COURT SO YOU CAN FTRE HIM AGAIN LIKE YOU HAVE

23) EVERYBODY ELSE?

23) BY MS NEIDER?

24)

MR PEDOCKIE NO, I WOULD NOT FIRE HIM

24)

MS NEIDER YES, JUDGE

THE COURT RIGHT OKAY ALL RIGHT ANYTHING ELSE WE

25)

THE COURT AND THE DEFENDANT, MR PEDOCKIE, IS PRESENT

25)
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1) AND ALSO IS REPRESENTING HIMSELF IN THIS CASE FOLKS, THIS

1) NAME">

2) IS A CRIMINAL CASE THE DEFENDANT IS CHARGED IN THIS MATTER

2)

A JUROR BOLLOM, JUST LIKE BOTTOM, YOU DON T CROSS THE

3) WITH AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING ITS ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED

3) TS

4) BACK IN JANUARY OF LAST YEAR, JANUARY 2ND AND 3RD THE

4)

5) ALLEGED VICTIM IN THIS CASE IS - IS IT JEANETTE SATHER?

5) YOU DO IS STAND AND ANSWER EACH OF THOSE QUESTIONS FOR US

6)

MS NEIDER SATHER, JUDGE

6) AND I MIGHT INDICATE, ITS VERY HELPFUL JUST BECAUSE WE HAVE

7)

THE COURT SATHER

7) A COURT REPORTER AND EVERYTHING S ON THE RECORD THAT WHEN YOU

8)

MS NEIDER SHE GOES BY NICOLE

8) RESPOND TO ANY QUESTION, IF YOU WOULD STAND, GIVE ME YOUR

9)

THE COURT NICOLE ALL RIGHT NICOLE SATHER ALL

THE COURT BOTTOM, ALL RIGHT WHAT ID LIKE TO HAVE

9) NAME AND WHAT JUROR NUMBER YOU ARE, JUST SO WE CAN KEEP TRACK

10) RIGHT AND DOES BOTH PARTIES HAVE A LIST OF ALL OF THE

10) OF EVERYBODY OKAY GO AHEAD

11) JURORS?

11)

A JUROR RALPH BOLLOM, NUMBER ONE

12)

MS NEIDER I DO, JUDGE

12)

THE COURT OKAY AND DO YOU HAVE THAT LIST OF

13)

THE COURT ALL RIGHT MR PEDOCKIE, DID YOU HAVE A

13) QUESTIONS THERE IN FRONT OF YOU1*

14) LIST OF THE JURORS?

14)

A JUROR YES

15)

MR PEDOCKIE YES, YOUR HONOR

15)

THE COURT ALL RIGHT IF YOUD JUST GO DOWN THE LIST

16)

THE COURT ALL RIGHT FOLKS, WE NEED TO HAVE EVERYBODY

16) THERE AND ANSWER EACH ONE OF THOSE FOR US

17) STAND AND RAISE YOUR RIGHT HAND YOU'LL HAVE TO TAKE AN OATH

17)

18) BEFORE WE BEGIN

18) IS ~ MY MAILING ADDRESS IS HUNTSVILLE

19)

(THE CLERK ADMINISTERED AN OATH TO THE JURORS )

19)

THE COURT OKAY

20)

THE COURT ALL RIGHT YOU MAY BE SEATED THEREIN

20)

A JUROR I'VE LIVED IN UTAH FOUR 17 YEARS I HAVE

A JUROR WELL, I RESIDE IN THE COUNTY OF WEBER, WHICH

21) FRONT OF YOU SHOULD BE A LIST OF ABOUT 20 QUESTIONS AND THE

21) LIVED IN OTHER STATES WISCONSIN I WAS IN WISCONSIN AND

22) FIRST THING WE HAVE TO DO IN THIS MATTER IS SELECT A JURY

22) LIVED 35 YEARS IN CALIFORNIA IM WIDOWED I DON'T HAVE ANY

23) FROM YOUR NUMBERS WE'RE GONNA SEAT ACTUALLY NINE JURORS TO

23) CHILDREN MY OFFICIAL TITLE OR OCCUPATION IS R ANDD

24) HEAR THE CASE SO WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO, WE'LL START WITH

24) TECHNICIAN AND I HAVE WORKED FOR MY EMPLOYER FOR 14 YEARS

